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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Respondent,
VS.

KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellants.
and,
THE ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE
RAMMELL, by it qualified personal
representative, Kenneth Rammell,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammell, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell
Judge

Date

Code

User

5/8/2009

SMIS

ROBBINS

Summons Issued (3)

Joel E. Tingey

NCOC

ROBBINS

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Joel E. Tingey

NOAP

ROBBINS

Plaintiff: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho
Corporation Notice Of Appearance Jeffrey D.
Brunson

Joel E. Tingey

ROBBINS

Filing: A- Civil Complaint for more than $1,000.00 Joel E. Tingey
Paid by: Brunson, Jeffrey D. (attorney for April
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation) Receipt
number: 0020910 Dated: 5/8/2009 Amount:
$88.00 (Check) For: April Beguesse, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation (plaintiff)

LYKE

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: David E.
Alexander Receipt number: 0043413 Dated:
9/21/2009 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Christa
Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation
(defendant), Rammell, Kenneth (defendant) and
The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell
(defendant)

ANSW

LYKE

Answer, Counterclaim, and Demand for Jury Trial Joel E. Tingey
(David E. Alexander for Kenneth Rammel!,
Christa Beguesse, Inc & Estate of Christa
Beguesse Rammell)

NDDT

LYKE

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of April
Beguesse, Inc

Joel E. Tingey

NTOS

LYKE

Notice Of Service of Defendants First Set of
Production of Documents

Joel E. Tingey

NOAP

LYKE

Defendant: Rammell, Kenneth Notice Of
Appearance David E Alexander

Joel E. Tingey

NOAP

LYKE

Defendant: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation Notice Of Appearance David E
Alexander

Joel E. Tingey

NOAP

LYKE

Defendant: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse
Rammell Notice Of Appearance David E
Alexander

Joel E. Tingey

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service
(Plaintiffs 1st Set of
Discovery Requests to Defendants) (fax)

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant, Christa Bequesse,
Inc.'s Counterclaim
(fax)

Joel E. Tingey

9/21/2009

10/8/2009

Joel E. Tingey

10/19/2009

NTOS

WOOLF

Notice Of Service (P's Response to Defendants' Joel E. Tingey
First Set of Requests for Production of
Documents)

10/23/2009

NOTC

WOOLF

Notice Vacating Deposition Duces Tecum of April Joel E. Tingey
Beguesse, Inc.

10/26/2009

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of april
Beguesse, Inc.

Joel E. Tingey

11/17/2009

NDDT

KESTER

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Kenneth
Rammel! **fax**

Joel E. Tingey

001
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!
Code

User

STIP

LYKE

Stipulation for Protective Order

Joel E. Tingey

:2/8/2009

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Protective Order

Joel E. Tingey

12/11/2009

NTOS

LYKE

Notice Of Service Plaintiffs First Supplemental
Response to Defendants' First Set of Requests
for Production of Documents

Joel E. Tingey

1/11/2010

MOTN

LYKE

Motion for Leave to File Amended Counterclaim

Joel E. Tingey

1/12/2010

MOTN

WOOLF

Objection to Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Joel E. Tingey
Amended Counterclaim

1/25/2010

NOTH

LYKE

Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Leave to File
Amended Counterclaim (02/09/10@9:00AM)

Joel E. Tingey

2/8/2010

STIP

WOOLF

Stipulation to Amend Pleadings

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

WOOLF

Motion to Amend Complaint

Joel E. Tingey

2/10/2010

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order to amend pleadings

Joel E. Tingey

2!18/20 10

COMP

WOOLF

First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand

Joel E. Tingey

10

NTOS

WOOLF

Notice Of Service (P's Response to Defendants' Joel E. Tingey
First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for
Admissions and Second Set of Requests for
Production

3/11/2010

ANSW

DOOLITTL

Answer to Amended Complaint and Amended
Counterclaim, and Demand for Jury Trial

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Motion to Shorten Time

Joel E. Tingey

3/16/2010

NTOS

LYKE

Notice Of Service - Plaintiffs Second Set of
Discovery Requests to Defendant

Joel E. Tingey

3/29/2010

MISC

KESTER

Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Amended
Counterclaim

Joel E. Tingey

3/30/2010

NORT

DOOLITTL

Note Of Issue/request For Trial

Joel E. Tingey

3/31/2010

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order for telephonic status conference

Joel E. Tingey

4/22/2010

HRHD

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Held -- in chambers off record

Joel E Tingey

ORPT

SOUTHWIC

Order Setting Pretrial Conference/trial

Joel E. Tingey

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/25/2011 10:00 Joel E. Tingey
AM) trial may go into a second week -- 2/02/2011

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
01/11/2011 08:30AM)

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

QUINTANA

Motion for Leave to File First Amended Answer

Joel E. Tingey

NOTC

QUINTANA

Notice Regarding Requests for Admissions
Deemed Admitted

Joel E. Tingey

QUINTANA

Plaintiffs Second Set of Discovery Requests to
Defendants

Joel E. Tingey

NTOS

QUINTANA

Notice Of Service Plaintiffs Second Set of
Discovery Requests to Defendants

Joel E Tingey

NTOS

TBROWN

Notice Of Service of Defs responses to pi's
second set of requests for admissions and
resposnes to plaintiffs second set of discovery

Joel E. Tingey

Date
~·. ~;2009

5/24/2010

5/28/2010
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Judge

Date

Code

User

6/11/2010

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service of Defendant's 2nd Set of
Requests for Admissions to Plaintiff

6/30/2010

NOTC

LYKE

Notice of Telephone Deposition Duces Tecum of Joel E. Tingey
Linda Diamond Raznick

7/8/2010

STIP

SBARRERA

Stipulation For Amended Protective Order

7/9/2010

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service (Plaintiff's Response to
Joel E. Tingey
Defendants' 2nd Set of Request for Admissions to
Plainff)
(fax)

12/2010

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

AMENDED Protective Order

7/16/2010

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service of Defendants' 3rd Set of
Joel E. Tingey
Requests for Production of Documents and
Defendants' 2nd Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff

7i27/2010

NTOS

SOLIS

Notice Of Service Of Defendants' Supplemental Joel E. Tingey
Responses To Plaintiff's Requests For Production
Of Documents and Interrogatories - 07/26/2010

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service (Plaintiff's 2nd Supplemental Joel E. Tingey
Response to Defendants' 1st Set of Requests for
Production of Documents and Plaintiff's 1st
Supplemental Response to Defendants' 1st Set of
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and 2nd
Set of Reequests for Production)
(fax)

NTOS

LYKE

Notice Of Service of Defendants' Fourth Set of
Requests for Production to Plaintiff

8/17/2010

NTOS

LYKE

Notice Of Service - Plaintiff's Response to
Joel E. Tingey
Defendants' Third Set of Requests for Production
and Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Second
Set of Interrogatories

8/24/2010

NTOS

LYKE

Notice Of Service - Plaintiff's Response to
Defendants' Fourth Set of Requests for
Production

Joel E. Tingey

9/1/2010

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/08/2010 09:00
AM) Alexander's motion for SJ

Joel E. Tingey

9/3/2010

NTOS

LYKE

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

LYKE

Notice Of Service of Memorandum of Law,
Affidavits and Exhibits Submitted in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Under Seal Pursuant to Protective Order
Document sealed
Motion for Summary Judgment

NOTH

LYKE

Notice Of Hearing re: Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (10/08/10@9:00AM)

Joel E. Tingey

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service of Indexed Copies of
Defendants' Brief and Statement of Facts, Filed
Under Seal
Document sealed
Affidavit of Pete Masterson
Document sealed

1

j/16/2010

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey
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Date

Code

User

9/24/2010

MEMO

SOLIS

AFFD

SOLIS

AFFD

SOLIS

AFFD

SOLIS

AFFD

SOLIS

SOLIS

Judge
Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To Motion
For Summary Judgment -IN BLACK BINDER
Document sealed
Affidavit Of Counsel- IN BLACK BINDER
Document sealed
Affidavit April Beguesse- IN BLACK BINDER
Document sealed
Affidavit Of Don Mazzella -IN BLACK BINDER
Document sealed
Second Affidavit Of Linda Diamond Raznick- IN
BLACK BINDER
Document sealed
Statement of Disputed Facts IN BLACK BINDER
Document sealed
Motion To Strike -IN BLACK BINDER

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey
Joel E. Tingey
Joel E. Tingey
Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

SOLIS

MEMO

SOLIS

NOTH

SOLIS

NTOS

SOLIS

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs 1st Supplemental Joel E. Tingey
Response to Defendants' 3rd Set of Requests for
Production upon the Defendants)

10/1/2010

NOTC

SBARRERA

Notice Of Filing Of Reply Brief Under Seal

Joel E. Tingey

10/4/2010

NOTH

SHULTS

Notice Of Hearing

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

SHULTS

Defendants' Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavits Joel E. Tingey
of April Beguesse and Don Mazzella and Second
Affidavit of Linda Diamond-Raznick

LYKE

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Strike
Document sealed
Hearing result for Motion held on 10/08/2010
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Jack Fuller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Alexander's motion for SJ -- under
100

10/7/2010

10/8/2010

DCHH

SOUTHWIC

Joel E. Tingey
Document sealed
Plaintiffis Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Joel E. Tingey
Strike- IN BLACK BINDER
Document sealed
Joel E. Tingey
Notice Of Hearing 10/08/2010 @9:00am RE:
Plaintiffs Motion To Strike- IN BLACK BINDER
Document sealed
Notice Of Service - Plaintiffs First Supplemental Joel E. Tingey
Response To Defendants' Second Set of
Interrogatories, Plaintiffs Second Supplemental
Response To Defendants' First Set Of
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions And
Second Set Of Requests For Production, and
Plaintiffs Third Supplemental Response To
Defendants' First Set Of Requests for Production
Documents

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!
Date

Code

User

Judge

10/8/2010

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry
Joel E. Tingey
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 10/8/2010
Time: 10:19 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!,
Attorney: David Alexander

'J/14/2010

NTOS

DOOL/TTL

Notice Of Service (Plaintiff's 3rd Supplemental Joel E. Tingey
Response to Defendants' 1st Set of
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and 2nd
Set of Requests for Production)
(fax)

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Expert Witness Disclosure (fax)

Joel E. Tingey

SOUTHWIC

Memorandum Decision and ORDER

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Disclosure of Expert Witnesses

Joel E. Tingey
Joel E. Tingey

------------------------------------------------------------------~--------------

11/2/2010

ORDR

11/5/2010
11/18/2010

NTOS

LYKE

Notice Of Service of Defendants' Third Set of
Interrogatories and Fifth Set of Requests for
Production of Documents to Plaintiff

12/9/2010

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service (Plaintiff's 4th Supplemental Joel E. Tingey
Response to Defendants' 1st Set of
lnterrogatorise, Requests for Admissions and 2nd
Set of Request for production upon the
Defendants) (fax)

12/13/2010

NTOS

LYKE

Notice Of Service of Supplemental Responses to Joel E. Tingey
Plaintiff's First Set of Discovery to Defendants

1512010

NTOS

ANDERSEN

Notice Of Service (P's Resp to Defs 3rd Set of
lnterrogs & 5th Set of Requests)

Joel E. Tingey

12/23/2010

MOTN

ANDERSEN

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration

Joel E. Tingey

MEMO

ANDERSEN

Plaintiffs Memoramdum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

SBARRERA

Plaintiff's Motion In Limine

Joel E. Tingey

MEMO

SBARRERA

Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs
Motion In Limine

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

SBARRERA

Notice Of Hearing RE: Plaintiffs Motion In Limine Joel E. Tingey
(01/11/2011 8:30AM)

/3/2011

MEMO

SOLIS

Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To Motion To Joel E. Tingey
Reconsider

/5/2011

MEMO

LYKE

Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Motion in Limine

12/28/2010

Joel E. Tingey
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, etal.
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell
Judge

Date

Code

User

1/6/2011

DCHH

SOUTHWIC

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Jack fuller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry
Joel E. Tingey
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 1/6/2011
Time: 11:01 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!,
Attorney: David Alexander

MISC

LYKE

Plaintiffs Witness List

Joel E. Tingey

MISC

LYKE

Plaintiffs Exhibit List

Joel E. Tingey

MISC

LYKE

Plaintiffs Proposed Special Verdict Form

Joel E. Tingey

MISC

LYKE

Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

SBARRERA

Plaintiffs Motion For Sanctions Or, In The
Alternative, For A Limited Continuance

Joel E. Tingey

MEMO

SBARRERA

Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Joel E. Tingey
Sanctions Or, In The Alernative, For A Limited
Continuance

NOTH

SBARRERA

Notice Of Hearing RE: Plaintiffs Motion For
Sanctions Or, In The Alternative, For A Limited
Continuance (01/11/2011 8:30AM)

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

SBARRERA

Motion To Shorten Time

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

SBARRERA

Affidavit Of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

MISC

LYKE

Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions and
Special Verdict Form

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Defendants' Exhibit List

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Witness List

Joel E. Tingey

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
Joel E. Tingey
01/11/2011 08:30AM: District Court Hearing Helt
Court Reporter: Jack fuller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100

1/7/2011

/10/2011

/11/2011

DCHH

Joel E. Tingey

OOG

User: LMESSICK

Date: 12/28/2012
ROAReport

Time: 02:05 PM

Case: CV-2009-0002767 Current Judge: Joel E Tingey

Page 7 of 18

April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, etal.

April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!
Date

Code

User

1/11/2011

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry
Joel E Tingey
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 1/11/2011
Time: 11:04 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!,
Attorney: David Alexander

CONT

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01/25/2011
Joel E. Tingey
10:00 AM: Continued trial may go into a second
week-- 2/02/2011

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order for telephonic status conference

Joel E. Tingey

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
02/09/2011 08:45 AM)

Joel E. Tingey

BRIF

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Brief Filed in Opposition to Plaintiffs Joel E. Tingey
Motion for Sanctions or Continunance

MOTN

SOLIS

Motion In Limine To Exclude Testimony By April
Beguesse As To Value Of Business

Joel E. Tingey

MEMO

SOLIS

Memorandum Of law In Support Of Defendants'
Motion In Limine To Exclude Testimony By April
Beguesse As To Value Of Business

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

SOLIS

Affidavit Of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

SOLIS

Notice Of Hearing 02/10/2011 @9:00AM RE:
Joel E. Tingey
Defendants' Motion In Limine To Exclude
Testimony By April Beguesse As To The Value Of
Business

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs 5th Supplemental Joel E. Tingey
Response to Defendants' 1st Set of
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and 2nd
Set of Requests for Production)

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order Re: January 6, 2011 Hearing

Joel E. Tingey

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order Regarding January 11, 2011 Hearing

Joel E. Tingey

RESP

LMESSICK

Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion in
Limine

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

LMESSICK

Affidavit of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

LYKE

Objection to Plaintiffs Subpoena of Janel! Racine Joel E. Tingey

HRHD

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Status Conference held on
02/09/2011 08:45AM: Hearing Held in
chambers off the record

Joel E. Tingey

ORPT

SOUTHWIC

Order Setting Pretrial Conference/trial

Joel E. Tingey

1/27/2011

1/28/2011

/3/2011

/8/2011
19/2011

Judge
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammell, etal.

April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!
Date

Code

User

2/9/2011

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/27/2011 10:00 Joel E. Tingey
AM) 5-6 days

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
09/13/2011 08:30AM)

MINE

QUINTANA

Joel E. Tingey
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Defendant's Motion in Limine
Hearing date: 2/10/2011
Time: 9:04 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Rhonda Quintana
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!,
Attorney: David Alexander

DENY

QUINTANA

Motion Denied

Joel E. Tingey

3/2/2011

ASRV

DOOLITTL

Amended Affidavit of Service- 2-10-11
Stephen E. Martin
Subpoena

Joel E. Tingey

3/4/2011

MOTN

SOLIS

Plaintiffs Motion To Consolidate

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

SOLIS

Affidavit Of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

SOLIS

Notice Of Hearing 03/22/2011 @9:00AM RE:
Plaintiffs Motion To consolidate

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

SOLIS

Plaintiffs Motion To Consolidate

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

SOLIS

Affidavit Of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

SOLIS

Notice Of Hearing 03/22/2011 @9:00AM RE:
Plaintiffs Motion To Consolidate

Joel E. Tingey

SOUTHWIC

Objection to motion to consolidate

Joel E. Tingey

SBARRERA

Objection To Motion To Consolidate

Joel E. Tingey

SOUTHWIC

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Jack fuller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100

Joel E. Tingey

2/10/2011

•:Jt2011

3/22/2011

DCHH

Joel E. Tingey
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, etaL

April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!
Date

Code

User

3/22/2011

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry
Joel E. Tingey
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 3/22/2011
Time: 10:20 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!,
Attorney: David Alexander

3/23/2011

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order on Motion to Consolidate (motion to
consolidate denied)

Joel E. Tingey

4/1/2011

NTOS

LYKE

Notice Of Service- Plaintiffs Sixth Supplemental
Response to Defendant

Joel E. Tingey

4/7/2011

MOTN

LYKE

Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend to Add
Claim for Punitive Damages

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

LYKE

Affidavit of John M. Avondet

Joel E. Tingey

MEMO

LYKE

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Leave to Amend to Add Claim for Punitive
Damages

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

LYKE

Notice Of Hearing Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Leave Joel E. Tingey
to Amend to Add Claim (04/21/11 @9:00AM)

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/21/2011 09:00
AM) Brunson - mo punitive damages

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Objection to motion for Leave to Add Claim for
Punitive Damages)

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

DCHH

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/21/2011
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Jack fuller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Brunson - mo punitive damages -under100

Joel E. Tingey

4/12/2011
4/15/2011

4/21/2011
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammell, etal.

April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!
Date

Code

User

4/21/2011

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry
Joel E. Tingey
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 4/21/2011
Time: 10:57 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!,
Attorney: David Alexander

4/22/2011

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order on motion to amend

Joel E. Tingey

5/10/2011

AMCO

LYKE

Second Amended Complaint Filed and Jury
Demand

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Notice of
Deposition Duces Tecum of April Beguesse
(fax)

Joel E. Tingey

,cU i i

Judge

8/11/2011

NTOS

LYKE

Notice Of Service - Supplemental Responses to
Plaintiffs First Set of Discovery to Defendants

Joel E. Tingey

8/30/2011

MOTN

LYKE

Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Bruce
Denney and Tax Information of Abi and April
Beguesse

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

LYKE

Affidavit of Jeffrey D. Brunson

Joel E. Tingey

MEMO

LYKE

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of ABI's
Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Bruce
Denney and Tax Information of Abi and April
Beguesse

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

LYKE

Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion in Limine
(9/13/11 @8:30AM)

Joel E. Tingey

c;i?/2011

NOTC

SBARRERA

Notice Of Deposition Of Kent Oseen

Joel E. Tingey

11

MOTN

LYKE

Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

LYKE

Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Protective Order Joel E. Tingey
(9/13/11 @8:30AM)

MOTN

LYKE

Plaintifs Motion to Shorten Time

Joel E. Tingey

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order Shortening Time

Joel E. Tingey

SBARRERA

Defendant's Brief In Opposition To Plaintiffs
Motions In Limine

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Witness List

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Exhibit List

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instruction

Joel E. Tingey

LYKE

Return Of Service - 9/06/11 (Kent Oseen Subpoena)

Joel E. Tingey

)/7/2011

1/8/2011

/9/2011

RTOS
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, eta!.
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammell, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell
Date

Code

9/12/2011

User

Judge

LYKE

Defendants' Witness List

Joel E. Tingey

LYKE

Defendants' Exhibit List

Joel E. Tingey

LYKE

Defendants' Proposed Special Verdict Form

Joel E. Tingey

LYKE

Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions and
Special Verdict Form

Joel E. Tingey

9/13/2011

DCHH

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Joel E. Tingey
on 09/13/2011 08:30 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Jack fuller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: + PI's mo for protective order under
100

9/14/2011

CONT

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
09/27/2011 10:00 AM: Continued 5-6 days

Joel E. Tingey

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order on Motion in Limine, Vacating Trial

Joel E. Tingey

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order for status conference - 10/07/11 @ 8:45
a.m.

Joel E. Tingey

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
10/07/2011 08:45AM)

Joel E. Tingey

HRHD

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
on 10/07/2011 08:45AM: Hearing Held in
chambers off record

Joel E. Tingey

ORPT

SOUTHWIC

Order Setting Pretrial Conference/trial

Joel E. Tingey

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/10/2012 10:00 Joel E. Tingey
AM) 4-5 days

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
03/20/2012 08:45AM)

2/16/2012

NTOS

BOULWARE

Notice Of Service - Plaintiffs Seventh
Joel E. Tingey
Supplemental Response to Defendant's First Set
of Interrogatories.

3/2/2012

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/06/2012 10:00
AM) Brunson- mo limine 1/2 hr

Joel E. Tingey

l/6/2012

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs 2nd Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony of Bruce Denney

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Jeffrey D. Brunson

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of David Smith

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing 4-6-12@ 10:00
a.m.
(Plaintiffs 2nd Motion in Limine to
Exclude Testimony of Bruce Denney)

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Exhibit List

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Witness List

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Exhibit List

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Witness List

Joel E. Tingey

CEARLY

Defendant's- Motion To Withdraw Deemed
Admissions

Joel E. Tingey

9/20/2011

10/7/2011

/15/2012
119/2012

- 2012

MOTN

Joel E. Tingey
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, etal.
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!
Date

Code

User

Judge

CEARLY

Response To Plaintiff's Motion In Limine To
Exclude Testimony Of Bruce Denny

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

CEARLY

Affidavit Of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

DCHH

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Joel E. Tingey
on 03/20/2012 08:45AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Jack fuller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100

SOUTHWIC

Request for Jury

3/20/2012

Joel E. Tingey

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry
Joel E. Tingey
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 3/20/2012
Time: 11:26 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!,
Attorney: David Alexander

3/22/2012

NOTH

CEARLY

Notice Of Hearing RE: Defendants' Motion To
Withdraw DEemed Admissions April6, 2012@
10:00 AM

Joel E. Tingey

3/23/2012

MOTN

LYKE

P- Renewed Motion in Limine to Limit the Tax
Information of ABI and April Beguesse

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

LYKE

Notice of Hearing Re: Renewed Motion
(04/06/12@1 O:OOAM)

Joel E. Tingey

BRIF

DOOLITIL

Defendant's Brief Filed in Opposition to Plaintiff's Joel E. Tingey
Renewed Motion In Limine to Limit the tax
Information of ABI and April Beguesse

ASRV

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of ServiceOseen, PA

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Affidavit of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITIL

Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Motion to
Withdraw Deemed Admissions

Joel E. Tingey

LYKE

Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Proposed Jury Joel E. Tingey
Instructions and Special Verdict Form

SOLIS

ABI's Reply Brief In Support OF ABI's Second
Joel E. Tingey
Motion In Limine To Exclude Testimony Of Bruce
Denney

3/29/2012

i3/2012
/4/2012

15/2012

BRIF

AFFD

DOOLITTL

3-26-12

Crandall and

Defendant's 2nd Affidavit of Counsel in

Opposition to Motions In Limine

(fax)

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, eta!.
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell
Judge

Date

Code

User

4/6/2012

DCHH

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Joel E. Tingey
04/06/2012 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing He I<
Court Reporter: Jack Fuller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Brunson- mo limine 1/2 hr --under
100

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry
Joel E. Tingey
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 4/6/2012
Time: 11:17 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammell, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell,
Attorney: David Alexander

DCHH

SOUTHWIC

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Jack Fuller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry
Joel E. Tingey
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 4/9/2012
Time: 4:19 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammell, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell,
Attorney: David Alexander

MOTN

SBARRERA

(Fax) Defendant- Motion To Quash Subpoena To Joel E. Tingey
Janell Racine

AFFD

SBARRERA

Affidavit Of Gary L Cooper

NOTC

CEARLY

Notice Of Videotaped Deposition Of Janell Racine Joel E. Tingey
(Fax)

ANSW

SOLIS

Answer To Second Amended ComplaintKenneth Rammell

Joel E. Tingey

TLST

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
04/10/2012 10:00 AM: Trial Started 4-5 days

Joel E. Tingey

4/9/2012

/10/2012

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, etal.
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell
Date

Code

User

4/12/2012

NOTC

SOLIS

Notice Vacating Videotaped Deposition Of Janel!
Racine (fax)

4/13/2012

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry
Joel E. Tingey
Hearing type: Jury Trial
Hearing date: 4/17/2012
Time: 9:54 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammell, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell,
Attorney: David Alexander

SOUTHWIC

Verdict Form

Joel E. Tingey

STATUS

SOUTHWIC

Case Status Changed: Closed

Joel E. Tingey

CD IS

SOUTHWIC

Civil Disposition entered for: Christa Beguesse,
Joel E. Tingey
Inc., and Idaho Corporation, Defendant; Rammel!,
Kenneth, Defendant; The Estate Of Christa
Beguesse Rammel!, Defendant; April Beguesse,
Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Plaintiff. Filing date:
4/17/2012

JDMT

SOUTHWIC

Judgment Upon Verdict- PI have jdmt against
defs jt & several of $354,000.00, PI have jdmt
against Def Christa Beguesse Inc. for
$190,013.00

Joel E. Tingey

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/01/2012 09:00
AM) Brunson - mo att fees/costs

Joel E. Tingey

STATUS

SOUTHWIC

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

CEARLY

Plaintiff-Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees And Joel E. Tingey
Costs

MEMO

CEARLY

Memorandum Of Law RE: Award Of Attorney's
Fees

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

CEARLY

Notice Of Hearing RE: Plaintiffs Motion For
Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs 6-1-12@
9:00AM

Joel E. Tingey

MEMO

CEARLY

ABI's Memorandum Of Attorney Fees And Costs
And Affidavit Of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Joel E. Tingey
the Verdict or in the Alternative for New Trial

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Affidavit of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

MEMO

DOOLITTL

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in
the Alternative for New Trial

Joel E. Tingey

4/17/2012

~/25/2012

t/26/2012

/30/2012

Judge
Joel E. Tingey

014
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, etal.
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammell, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!
Judge

Date

Code

User

5/1/2012

AFFD

SBARRERA

Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

5/2/2012

TRAN

SOUTHWIC

Transcript Filed-- excerpt from Jury trial 4/13/12
before Judge Joel Tingey

Joel E. Tingey

5/4/2012

NOTH

HUMPHREY

Notice Of Hearing June 1, 2012 @9:00am
Joel E. Tingey
Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict

. 0/2012

MOTN

SBARRERA

Motion To Disallow Claimed Costs and Attorneys' Joel E. Tingey
Fees

5/9/2012

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Motion To Disallow Claimed Costs And Attorneys' Joel E. Tingey
Fees

5/25/2012

MEMO

SOLIS

Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To
Defendants' Motion For JNOV Or New Trial

5/31/2012

CONT

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Joel E. Tingey
06/01/2012 09:00AM: Continued Brunson - mo
att fees/costs

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/05/2012 10:30
AM) Brunson - Mo Att fees/Costs
Alexander- Mo JNOV

SOUTHWIC

Notice of Hearing

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey

6/1/2012

MEMO

SOUTHWIC

PI's Memorandum in Opposition to Defs' Motion
for JNOV or New Trial

12

DCHH

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Joel E. Tingey
06/05/2012 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Jack fuller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Brunson Mo Att fees/Costs
Alexander- Mo JNOV --under 100

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry
Joel E. Tingey
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 6/5/2012
Time: 1:55 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!,
Attorney: David Alexander

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Supplemental Order On Motion For New Trial

Joel E. Tingey

SBARRERA

Plaintiffs Acceptance Of Court's Remittitur

Joel E. Tingey

SOUTHWIC

Order on Motion For costs and Attorney Fees (PI Joel E. Tingey
is awarded $2409.29 in costs & $85,000.00 in att
fees against Kenneth Rammel! and CBI)

3/12/2012
)/19/20 12

ORDR

Joel E. Tingey

0 l~S
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, etaL
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!
Da~

Code

User

6/19/2012

JDMT

SOUTHWIC

AMENDED Judgment (PI have jdmt against Defs Joel E. Tingey
Kenneth Rammel! & Christa Beguesse, Inc, jt and
several, in the amt of $354,000.00 PI also have
jdmt against Def Christa Beguesse, Inc in the
additional amt of $99,900 for a total of $453,900.
PI also have jdmt against Defs K Rammel! & CBI
for costs in the amt of $2409.29 & att fees in the
amt of $85,000. Resulting in a total jdmt of
$541,309.29 as to CBI and $441,409.29 as to
Kenneth Rammell + int). PI's claim against the
Estate of Christa Beguesse is dismissed with
prejudice.

STATUS

SOUTHWIC

Case Status Changed: Closed

SBARRERA

Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Joel E. Tingey
Supreme Court Paid by: Racine Olson Receipt
number: 0035844 Dated: 7/24/2012 Amount:
$109.00 (Check) For: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and
Idaho Corporation (defendant) and Rammel!,
Kenneth (defendant)

NOTC

SBARRERA

Notice Of Appeal (Kenneth Rammel!, Crista
Beguesse)

Joel E. Tingey

APSC

LMESSICK

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Joel E. Tingey

CERTAP

LMESSICK

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

Joel E. Tingey

BNDC

LMESSICK

Bond Posted Cash (Receipt 36676 Dated
7/30/2012 for 100.00)

Joel E. Tingey

STATUS

LMESSICK

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

CEARLY

Affidavit Of Interest

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

CEARLY

Motion For Garnishment

Joel E. Tingey

WRIT

CEARLY

Writ Issued (Estate) $447,752.75

Bonneville

Joel E. Tingey

WRIT

CEARLY

Writ Issued (Bank)

Bonneville

Joel E. Tingey

WRIT

CEARLY

Writ Issued (Jeep)

CEARLY

Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Joel E. Tingey
by: Beard St. Clair Gaffney Receipt number:
0038263 Dated: 8/7/2012 Amount: $6.00
(Check)

WRRT

CEARLY

Writ Returned (Jeep)

WRIT

CEARLY

Writ Issued (Jeep)

CEARLY

Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Joel E. Tingey
by: Beard St. Clair Gaffney Receipt number:
0038789 Dated: 8/10/2012 Amount: $2.00
(Check)

LMESSICK

(SC) ORder Re: Amended Notice of Appeal

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

SBARRERA

Affidavit Of Interest

Joel E. Tingey

WRIT

SBARRERA

Writ Issued

7/20/2012

7/30/2012

8/7/2012

3/10/2012

l/14/2012
V17/2012

Judge

$447,752.75
$447,752.75

Joel E. Tingey

Bonneville

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey
$447,752.75

$549,660.73

Bonneville

Bonneville

Joel E. Tingey

Joel E. Tingey
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, eta!.
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!
Date

Code

User

Judge

SBARRERA

Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Joel E. Tingey
by: Beard St Clair Receipt number: 0040006
Dated: 8/17/2012 Amount: $2.00 (Check)

WRTU

CEARLY

Writ returned, Unsatisfied (Bank)

Joel E. Tingey

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/05/2012 08:30
AM) Brunson -- ABI's objection to Rammell's
claim of exemption

Joel E Tingey

STATUS

SOUTHWIC

Case Status Changed: Reopened

Joel E. Tingey

8/22/2012

NOTC

DOOLITTL

Appellants' Amended Notice of Appeal

Joel E. Tingey

<)4!2012

WRTU

SBARRERA

Writ returned, Unsatisfied

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption
and for Injunctive Relief

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Notice Of Hearing 9-18-12 @ 11:00
{Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption
a.m.
and for Injunctive Relief}

Joel E. Tingey

LMESSICK

(SC) Amended Notice of Appeal Filed - Record
due 12/5/12

Joel E Tingey

8/17/2012

8/21/2012

8/30/2012

(Plaintiff)

9/13/2012

AFFD

SOLIS

Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel

Joel E Tingey

9/17/2012

NOTH

HUMPHREY

Amended Notice Of Hearing - 10/05/2012 @
9:00AM RE: Motion To Contest Claim Of
Exemption And For Injunctive Relief (Fax)

Joel E. Tingey

9/20/2012

CONT

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
09/18/2012 11:00 AM: Continued Brunson -ABI's objection to Rammell's claim of exemption

Joel E. Tingey

HRSC

SOUTHWIC

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/05/2012 09:00
AM) Brunson - ABI's objection to Rammell's
claim of exemption

Joel E. Tingey

10/5/2012

HRHD

SOUTHWIC

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
10/05/2012 09:00AM: Hearing Held BrunsonABI's objection to Rammell's claim of exemption

Joel E. Tingey

10/18/2012

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Order

Joel E Tingey

10/24/2012

AFFD

HUMPHREY

Affidavit Of Interest

Joel E. Tingey

WRIT

HUMPHREY

Writ Of Execution Issued $452,740.99
Bannock

Joel E. Tingey

HUMPHREY

Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Joel E. Tingey
by: Beard St Clair Gaffney Receipt number:
0051625 Dated: 10/24/2012 Amount: $2.00
(Check)

MOTN

CEARLY

Defendant- Ex Parte Motion To Shorten Time

Joel E. Tingey

MOTN

CEARLY

Motion To Amend Order

Joel E Tingey

AFFD

CEARLY

Affidavit Of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

NOTH

CEARLY

Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion To Amend And
Motion To shorten Time
11-13-12 @ 4:00
PM

Joel E. Tingey

11/13/2012

017

12/28/2012
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, eta!.

April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!
Date

Code

User

11/13/2012

DCHH

SOUTHWIC

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Jack fuller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100

SOUTHWIC

Objection to Motion to Amend Order and Request Joel E. Tingey
to appear Telephonically

AFFD

SOUTHWIC

Affidavit of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

ORDR

SOUTHWIC

Amended Order

Joel E. Tingey

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Objection to Motion to Amend Order
and Request to Appear Telephonic
(fax)

Joel E. Tingey

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Affidavit of Counsel

Joel E. Tingey

11/14/2012

MINE

SOUTHWIC

Minute Entry
Joel E. Tingey
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 11/14/2012
Time: 7:54 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick
Tape Number:
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David
Alexander
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!,
Attorney: David Alexander

11/16/2012

WRTU

DOOLITTL

Writ returned, Unsatisfied

Joel E. Tingey

12/26/2012

WRTU

DOOLITTL

Writ returned, Unsatisfied

Joel E. Tingey

Judge

(fax)

Joel E. Tingey

018
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
Jolm M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
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CASE ASSIGNED TO
HON. JOEL E. TINGEY

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-09-

?r:t04-

VS.

Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammel!,

Complaint and Jury Demand

Defendants.

Plaintiff, April Beguesse, Inc., through its attorneys, alleges and complains
against the Defendants as follows.
PARTIES

1. April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI) is an Idaho Corporation set up under the laws of
the State of Idaho.
2. Kenneth Rammell (Rammell) is an individual residing in Bonneville County,

01 q

Idaho.

Complaint and Jury Demand
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3. Christ Beguesse, Inc. (CBI) is an Idaho Corporation set up under the laws of
the State of Idaho.
4. The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its personal representative,
Kenneth Rammell, filed an application for informal probate in B01meville County, Idaho
on March 11, 2009, Case No. CV-09-1682.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code § 5514.
6. Bonneville County is the proper venue for this action under Idaho Code § 5404.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
7. In November 2001, April Beguesse (April) was contacted by her mother,
Christa Beguesse (Christa), regarding the possibility of April taking over Christa's
business, CBI. April traveled to Idaho Falls to discuss the possibility with Christa and
Rammell.
8. CBI was in the type setting business.
9. Rammell and Christa were both officers and directors in CBI.
10. Rammell and Christa told April that she could purchase and take over the
business.
11. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI had a guaranteed selfsustaining contract with a customer.
12. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a library of
proprietary books valued at over $1,000,000.

0 20

13. Rammel! and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a proprietary
Complaint and Jury Demand
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software program unique to CBI's business.
14. Rammell and Christa represented that CBI owned intellectual property.
15. Rammell and Christa indicated that they would sell the business for $12,000 a
month for eight years.
16. Rammell stated that they were being very generous and that April would be a
fool not to accept the offer.
17. On January 2002, April left a promising career in Boston, Massachusetts to
work for CBI.
18. Initially, April worked for CBI as an employee.
19. In November 2003, April formed ABI.
20. Both Rammell and Christa indicated on many occasions that the assets of CBI
would be left to April when Christa died.
21. In February 2004, ABI commenced making monthly payments to CBI for
$12,000 month.
22. ABI took ownership of all past and current debts of CBI and started operating
the business. ABI paid all the bills including the monthly rent to a third party.
23. ABI purchased all new computers, printers, scanners, phone system, updated
programs and hardware and updated the office furniture.
24. Ranunell indicated that he had a contract that his brother had used for his
business that Rammell had altered.
25. Christa had Rammell remove a clause in the contract that stated in the case of
Christa's death payments would continue.
26. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI' s assets would be

Q21

bequeathed to her after Christa died.
Complaint and Jury Demand

Page 3

27. Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease after
Christa's death.
28. Rammell and Christa repeatedly made the representations alleged in the
previous paragraphs.
29. Based on the representations of Rammell and Christa, April ultimately signed
a document entitled "lease agreement". The purported agreement is between CBI and
ABI and made effective January 1, 2004.
30. The purported agreement provides:
BUSINESS AND EQUIPMENT. For and in consideration of the promises
set forth in this Lease and the payment of the rents specified in this Lease,
Lessor leases, demises and rents unto the Lessee, and Lessee leases,
demises and rents from Lessor, that certain business described in Exhibit
'A' attached hereto (the 'Business"), that certain equipment described in
Exhibit 'B' attached hereto. (Such business and equipment identified in
Exhibits 'A' and 'B', shall collectively be referred to herein as 'the
Property', unless otherwise indicated.
31. Exhibits A and B attached to the purported agreement were completely blank.
32. ABI continued making monthly payments to CBI in an amount of $12,000
until November 1, 2008.
33. ABI also paid Christa for consulting and professional services.
34. On November 10, 2008, Christa died.
35. No will was discovered leaving CBI's assets to April.
36. A holographic paragraph was produced by Rammell that states all of Christa's
possessions go to Rammel!.
37. After visiting an attorney after her mother's death, April learned for the first
time that the representations made by Rammell and Christa alleged in the previous
paragraphs were false.

022

38. There was no guaranteed contract with a major customer. Rather, the
Complaint and Jury Demand
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customer could leave at any time.
39. The library referenced by Rammell and Christa is actually owned by the
customer.
40. The referenced proprietary software program was a software program that
could be purchased offthe shelf.
41. On March 1, 2009, April moved to Nevada.
42. On March 11, 2009, Rammell applied for informal probate for Christa's estate
in Bonneville County, Idaho, Case No. CV-09-1682.
43. On April13, 2009, Christa's estate on behalf of CBI filed a complaint against
ABI and April individually in Clark County, Nevada, Case No. A587645. The Nevada
complaint seeks to enforce the purported agreement.
44. A motion to dismiss the Nevada case is being filed on the basis of forum non
convemens.
COUNT ONE: DECLARATORY RELIEF
45. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.
46. Critical portions to the purported lease contract between ABI and CBI were
left blank.
47. ABI and CBI did not form a lease contract because there was never mutual
assent.
48. ABI and CBI did not form a lease contract because the purported agreement is
missing essential terms.
49. ABI and CBI never contemplated a lease of the business but rather
contemplated a purchase of certain CBI assets.
50. This Court has the power to declare that there is no lease contract between
Complaint and Jury Demand
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ABI and CBI pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201.
51. ABI is an interested person as defined by Idaho Code § 10-1202.
52. This Court should declare that:
a. ABI is under no continuing obligation to make payments to CBI;
b. Monies previously paid by ABI to CBI should be refunded to ABI; and
c. There is no enforceable lease contract between ABI and CBI.
53. Alternatively, the lease contract should be reformed to meet the intent of
parties.
54. To the extent the Comi finds an enforceable contract, the contract should be
rescinded due to the defendants' fraudulent conduct and all monies paid should be
refunded.
55. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect
its rights. ABI is entitled to attomey fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code § § 12-120
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.

COUNT TWO: FRAUD
56. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.
57. The defendants acting individually and on behalf of CBI made numerous
representations to ABI and April including but not limited to the following:
a. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI had a guaranteed selfsustaining contract with a major customer.
b. Rammell and Clu·ista represented to April that CBI owned a library of
proprietary books valued at over $1,000,000.
c. Ranunell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a proprietary

02 4

software program unique to CBI's business.
Complaint and Jury Demand
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d. Rammell and Christa represented that there was intellectual property
unique to CBI.
e. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI' s assets would be
bequeathed to her after Christa died.
f.

Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease
afier Christa's death.

58. The defendants failed to disclose that:
a. There was no guaranteed contract and that the major customer could leave
at any time for any reason.
b. The library of proprietary books was in fact owned by the major customer
and not CBI.
c. That the software program utilized by CBI could be purchased off the
shelf.
d. That CBI did not own any intellectual property.
59. The statements and omissions of the defendants were false.
60. The statements and omissions of the defendants were material.
61. The defendants knew the statements and omissions were false.
62. The defendants intended that ABI rely on the false statements and omissions.
63. ABI and April did not know the statements and omissions were false.
64. ABI relied on the statements and omissions by signing the purported
agreement and by paying $12,000 a month to CBI from February 2004 to November
2008.
65. Such reliance by ABI was justifiable.
66. As a result of the defendants' false statements and omissions, ABI has been
Complaint and Jury Demand
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damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
67. The defendants' conduct constitutes affinnative fraud, fraud by omission, and
fraud in the inducement.
68. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.
COUNT THREE: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
69. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.
70. The defendants and ABI had a relationship of trust and confidence because
ChTista, Rammell, and April were members of the same family and CBI and ABI were in
contractual negotiations and ultimately signed an agreement.
71. The defendants breached this relationship of trust and confidence.
72. ABI is not required to establish that the defendants' knew their statement and
omissions were false or that the defendants intended ABI rely on their false statements
and omissions.
73. The defendants conduct constitutes constructive fraud.
74. As a result of the defendants' conduct, ABI has been damaged in an amount to
be proven at trial.
75. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 12-120
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.
COUNT FOUR: BREACH OF CONTRACT
76. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.
77. The defendants promised to sell or assign several assets of CBI to ABI in
Complaint and Jury Demand
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exchange for payment of $12,000/month.
78. These assets include but are not limited to:
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer;
b. a library of proprietary books valued at over a million dollars;
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI's business;
d. other intellectual property.
79. The parties' exchange of promises constitutes a binding contract.
80. ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract and is not in
material breach.
81. The defendants materially breached the contract by failing to provide the
agreed upon assets.
82. The defendants conduct constitutes a failure of consideration.
83. The defendants conduct also constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
84. The defendants' material breaches are the direct and proximate cause of
damages to ABI.
85. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
86. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 12-120
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.

COUNT FIVE: BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY
87. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.
88. ABI and the defendants entered a contract for the sale of CBI' s assets.

027

89. ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract.
Complaint and Jury Demand
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90. As part of the contract the defendants expressly represented and warranted
that CBI could transfer the following assets:
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer;
b. a library of proprietary books valued at over a million dollars;
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI's business;
d. other intellectual prope1iy.
91. This warranty was a material term of the contract and its breach constitutes a
material breach of the contract.
92. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-312, in every contract for sale there is a
warranty of title that the title is good and its transfer is rightful.
93. Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 28-2-313,28-121-210, any affirmation of fact or
promise made by the seller or lessor to the buyer or lessee, which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.
94. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-313, any description of the goods which is
made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the description.
95. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-12-211, there is a warranty that no other person
holds a claim to or interest in the goods.
96. Contrary to the defendants' warranties, CBI could not transfer the assets
because such assets did not exist or were not owned by CBI and the assets transferred, if
any, did not conform.
97. The breach of warranty is the direct and proximate cause of damages to ABI.
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98. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
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99. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code § § 1 120
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.
COUNT SIX: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY

100.

ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.

101.

ABI and the defendants entered a contract for the sale of CBI' s assets.

102.

ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract.

103.

As part of the contract the defendants impliedly warranted that CBI could

transfer the following assets:
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer;
b. a library of proprietary books valued at over a million dollars;
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI' s business;
d. other intellectual prope1iy.
104.

This wananty was a material term of the contract and its breach

constitutes a material breach of the contract.
I 05.

As part of the contract, the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets

to be transferred would be merchantable, that is to say that it would pass without
objection in the trade under the contract description; that it would be fit for the ordinary
purpose of such goods; and that it would conform to the promises or affirmations of fact
made.
106.

As part of the contract the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets

was fit for a particular purpose, that is to say that the defendants knew the purpose for
which ABI intended it and that the ABI was relying upon the defendants to furnish the
assets, and warranted thus impliedly warranted that the assets were suitable for that
Complaint and Jury Demand
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purpose.
107.

Contrary to the defendants' warranties, CBI could not transfer the assets

because such assets did not exist or were not owned by CBI and such assets did not
conform or were not suitable for ABI's purposes.
108.

The breach of warranty is the direct and proximate cause of damages to

109.

ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

110.

ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to

ABI.

protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.

COUNT SEVEN: UNJUST ENIRCHMENT
111.

ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.

112.

ABI provided a benefit to the defendants by paying $12,000 a month from

February 2004 to November 2008.
113.

Because ABI did not get what was promised, it would be unjust for ABI to

retain the benefit.
114.

As a result of defendants' conduct, ABI has been damaged in an amount to

be proven at trial.
115.

ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to

protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.
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COUNT EIGHT: QUASI-ESTOPPEL
116.

ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.

117.

The defendants took the position that April would no longer make any

payments after Clu·ista' s death.
118.

Christa had Rammell remove a clause in the contract that stated in the case

of Christa's death payments would continue.
119.

Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI's assets would be

bequeathed to her after Christa died.
120.

Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease

after Christa's death.
121.

On November 10,2008, Christa died.

122.

No will was discovered leaving CBI's assets to April or ABI.

123.

A holographic paragraph was produced by Rammell that states all of

Christa's possessions go to Rammel!.
124.

ABI relied on the representations to its disadvantage.

125.

It would be unconscionable to allow the defendants to maintain the

inconsistent position that payments were to continue after Christa's death.
126.

The defendants should be estopped from claiming that the payments must

continue.
127.

ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to

protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
1. Judgment against the defendants in an amount to be proven at trial.
2. A declaration that:
a. ABI is under no continuing obligation to make payments to CBI;
b. Monies previously paid by ABI to CBI should be refunded to ABI; and
c. There is no enforceable lease contract between ABI and CBI.
3. An order estopping the defendants from claiming payments should continue.
4. An award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to agreement Idaho Code§§ 12120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.
5. Any other relief the Court deems just and proper.
PURSUANT TO RULE 38 OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY

Dated: May 7, 2009.

ns , ISB No. 6996
ondet, ISB No. 7438
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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\V. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629)
David Alexander (ISB#: 4489)
RA.CINE, OLSON, NYE,
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208)232-61 01
Fax: (208)232-61 09
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,

)
)

Case No. CV-09-2767

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM,
AND DEMAND FOR JlJRY TRIAL

)
)

KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, ESTATE OF CHRISTA
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by its qualified
personal representative, Kenneth
Rammel!.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

____________________________ )
COME NOW the Defendants, KENNETH RAMMELL individually and as personal
representative of the ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, and CHRISTA
BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, by and through their attorney of record, Marcus W. Nye
of the finn of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, and in response to the Complaint of
the Plaintiff filed herein, admit, deny and allege as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
The Complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against these
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Defendants, and should be dismissed.

SECOND DEFENSE
1.

Defendants deny each and every allegation ofthe Complaint not specifically admitted

2.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 1 though 9 of the Complaint.

3.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 10 though 14 of the Complaint.

4.

In response to paragraph 15 ofthe Complaint, Defendants state that a contract was

herein.

entered into between Christa Beguesse, Inc. and April Beguesse, Inc., the tem1s of which contract
speak for themselves.
5.

Defendants are without sufficient infonnation to detem1ine the truth of the allegations

of Paragraph 16 ofthe Complaint, and therefore deny the same.
6.

Defendants are without sufficient information to fonn an opinion as to the truth of

the allegations in paragraph 17, and therefore deny the same.
7.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Complaint.

8.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 20 of the Complaint.

9.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Complaint.

10.

Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the

allegations of paragraph 23 of the Complaint, and therefore deny the same.
11.

Paragraph 24 of the Complaint fails to state facts with sufficient clarity to permit

these defendants from forming an opinion as to their truth or falsity, and Defendants therefore deny
the same. To the extent paragraph 24 makes any allegations regarding the contents of a contract,
Defendants respond that said contract speaks for itself.
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12.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 25 of the Complaint, and state further

that the contract speaks for itself.
13.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 of the Complaint.

14.

In response to paragraph 29, Defendants deny that April signed the contract "based

on the representations of Rammell and Christa." Defendants admit that April signed a contract
entitled "Lease Agreement" between CBI and ABI, effective January 1, 2004.
15.

In response to paragraphs 3 0 and 31 of the Complaint, Defendant states that the

alleged contract speaks for itself.
16.

The Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 32 through 36.

17.

The Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 37.

18.

In response to paragraph 38 of the Complaint, to the extent that it alleges the

existence of a contract between CBI and a customer, said contract speaks for itself.
19.

In response to paragraph 39 of the Complaint, Defendants deny ever having made

reference to a "library" owned by CBI, or any representations contrary to the facts.
20.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 40 of the complaint.

21.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 41 through 44 ofthe complaint.
COUNT 1: DECLARATORY RELIEF

22.

In response to paragraph 45 of the complaint, the Defendants restate their

responses to paragraphs 1 through 44.
Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 46 through 50.
24.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 51 of the Complaint.

25.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 52 to 55 of the Complaint.
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COUNT2: FRAUD
26.

In response to paragraph 56 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses

to paragraphs 1 through 55.
27.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 57 through 68.
COUNT 3: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD

28.

In response to paragraph 69 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses

to paragraphs 1 through 68.
29.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 70 through 75 of the Complaint.
COUNT 4: BREACH OF CONTRACT

30.

In response to paragraph 76 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses

to paragraphs 1-7 5.
31.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 77 and 78.

32.

In response to paragraph 79 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that the parties

entered into a binding contract, pursuant to which the parties performed from January 2004 until
November 2008, and that the terms of the contract speak for themselves.
33.

In response to paragraph 80 of the Complaint. Defendant admits that ABI

substantially performed its obligations under the contract until November 2008, at which time it
ceased performing under the contract, and is cuHently in material breach thereof.
34.

Defendants deny the allegations of 81 through 86 of the Complaint.
COUNT 5: BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY

35.

In response to paragraph 87 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses 1

through 86.
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36.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 88 of the Complaint.

37.

In response to paragraph 89, Defendants allege that Plaintiff is in material breach

of its obligations under the contract.
38.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 90 and 91.

39.

In response to paragraphs 92 through 95 of the Complaint, the Idaho Statutes

referenced therein speak for themselves and are the best evidence of the statutory requirements.
Said paragraphs do not otherwise appear to require a response from the Defendants.
40.

Defendant deny the allegations of paragraphs 96 through 99.
COUNT 6: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY

41.

In response to paragraph 100 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses

to paragraphs 1 through 99.
42.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 101.

43.

In response to paragraph 102, Defendants admit that ABI sustantially performed

its obligations under the contract through November 2008, but since that time is in material
breach of the contract.
44.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 103 through 110.
COUNT 7: UNJUST El'i'RICHMENT

45.

In response to paragraph 111 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses

to paragraphs 1 through 110.
46.

In response to paragraph 112, Defendants admit that ABI paid Defendants

$12,000.00 per month for February 2004 to November 2008. Defendants deny all other
allegations ofparagraph 112.
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47.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 113 through 115 of the Complaint.
COUNT 8: QUASI-ESTOPPEL

48.

In response to paragraph 116 ofthe Complaint, Defendant restates its responses to

paragraphs 1 through 115.
49.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 117 through 120 of the Complaint.

50.

Defendants admit the allegation of paragraphs 121 through 122 ofthe Complaint.

51.

In response to Paragraph 123 of the Complaint, Defendants aver that a

holographic will was produced.
52.

Defendant deny the allegations of paragraphs 124 through 127 of the Complaint.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The claims of the Plaintiff are barred by the applicable statutes of frauds, including but
not limited to Idaho Code§ 9-505, § 15-2-701, and§ 28-2-201.
SECOND AFFIRl\1A TIVE DEFENSE
The claims of the Plaintiff are barred by the applicable of statutes of limitations, including
but not limited to I.C. § 5-216, § 5-217, § 5-218, and§§ 15-3-801, et seq.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims for declaratory judgement, fraud, constructive fraud, breach of contract,
breach of express and implied vvarranties and unjust enrichment and quasi-estoppel are barred by
the doctrine of laches.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
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Plaintiff should be estopped from denying its obligations and duties under the contract.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants expressly disclaimed in the contract all express and implied wananties.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims should be baned by Plaintiffs material breach of the contract at issue in
this matter.
ATTORNEY FEES
Defendants have been required to retain the services of the law firm of Racine, Olson,
Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd., and are entitled to a reasonable fee therefor pursuant to Idaho Code,
including, but not limited to, I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 and paragraph 17 of the Lease
Agreement between the parties.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that judgment be entered in this action declaring the
respective rights and duties of the parties, dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice,
awarding the Defendants their reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and granting Defendants such
other and further relief as is just under the circumstances.
COUNTERCLAIM
COMES NOW, Defendant /Counterclaimant Christa Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho
corporation, by and through counsel, and for its Counterclaim against the
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, April Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho corporation, as follows:
PARTIES & JURISDICTION
1.

Defendant/Counterclaimant Christa Beguesse, Inc. (herein "CBI"), is a

corporation in good standing registered under the laws of the State of Idaho, having its principal
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place of business in Idaho Falls, Bo1meville County, Idaho.
2.

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant April Beguesse, Inc. (herein "ABI"), is a corporation

in good standing registered under the laws of the State ofidaho, having its principal place of
business in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho.
3.

The actions, or failures to act, giving rise to this cause of action occurred or

should have occurred in Bom1eville County, Idaho.
4.

Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this court.

BACKGROUND
5.

For several years, CBI operated a profitable business and acquired assets for the

operation of the business.
6.

On or before January 1, 2004, CBI entered into an agreement with ABI, pursuant

to which ABI agreed to lease the business and assets (collectively "the Assets") from CBI for a
period of eight consecutive years commencing January 1, 2004. The Lease Agreement (herein
"the Agreement") between CBI and ABI required ABI to make rent payments to CBI in the
amount of $12,000 per month, beginning in January 2004 and continuing for ninety-six months,
through December 31, 2011. A true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as
Exhibit A, and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth fully.

7.

The Agreement provided that the Assets leased to ABI were to be described in

exhibits attached thereto. Even though the parties inadvertently failed to specifically describe the
leased Assets in the exhibits, the parties performed their obligations under the Agreement for a
period of almost 5 years, until November 2008. During the years of performance, ABI used
CBI's Assets, and ABI also made the required lease payments to CBI, thereby establishing
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through the parties' conduct and dealings the specific assets that were intended to be the subject
of the Agreement.
8.

ABI has failed or refused to make the rent payments to CBI after November 2008,

despite having been given notice of default. CBI never received payment from ABI for
December 2008 or any month thereafter.
9.

Since November 2008, ABI has continued to use CBI's Assets to operate the

business that was the subject of the Agreement.
10.

On information and belief, since it stopped making the rent payments to CBI, ABI

has continued to make profits from the use of CBI' s Assets.
COUNT I
(Breach of Contract)
11.

CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs of this Counterclaim by

reference and incorporates the same as if set forth fully.
12.

The above-described Agreement is a legal and binding contract properly formed

between CBI and ABI.
13.

ABI's failure or refusal to make the rent payments as required by the Agreement is

a material breach of the Agreement.
14.

CBI has suffered damages, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of ABI's

breach, in the amount of $12,000 per month for unpaid rent, beginning with December 2008 and
continuing until such time as the breach is cured or the lease expires, together with interest
accruing on each payment from the due date at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum.
COUNT II
(Unjust Enrichment)

ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 9

041

15.

CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs of this Counterclaim by

reference and incorporates the same as if set forth fully.
16.

ABI has remained in possession of and continues to use CBI's Assets that were

the subject of the lease Agreement even though it has failed to make the rent payments therefor.
17.

ABI continues to derive a valuable economic benefit from its wrongful use of the

CBI's Assets that were the subject of the lease Agreement.
18.

CBI has conferred a benefit upon ABI, which benefit has been appreciated by

ABI, and it would be inequitable for ABI to retain the benefit without payment for the value
thereof to CBI.
19.

ABI has been unjustly enriched and is liable to CBI for the value of the benefit

conferred, in an amount to be established at trial.

COUNT III
(Constructive Trust)
20.

CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs of this Counterclaim by

reference and incorporates the same as if set forth fully.
21.

ABI has remained in possession of and continues to use the Assets that were the

subject ofthe Agreement with CBI even though it has failed to make full payment to CBI for
those Assets.
22.

ABI's continued use of the Assets without full payment to CBI is wrongful.

23.

ABI continues to derive an economic benefit from its wrongful use of the Assets

that were the subject of the Agreement.
24.

CBI has no adequate remedy at law and is entitled to a constructive trust in its

favor for all profits earned by ABI derived from the Assets that were the subject of the
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Agreement with CBI and for which ABI has not made full payment.

A TTOR~EY FEES
25.

CBI has been required to retain the assistance of the law firm Racine, Olson, Nye,

Budge & Bailey, Chartered, to pursue and protect its legal interests related to this matter and is
entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code, including sections 12120(3) and 12-121, and pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Lease Agreement between the parties.
WHEREFORE, CBI prays for judgment against Counterdefendant ABI as follows:
A

For a money judgment in the amount of$12,000 per month, beginning with

December 2008 through such time as ABI cures its default or is no longer obligated to make
payments under the Lease Agreement; or in the alternative, for the value of the benefit CBI has
confeiTed upon ABI for which it is unjust for ABI to retain, in an amount to be established at
trial; plus interest thereon from each payment due date at the rate of 8% per annum.
B.

For a constructive trust in favor of CBI for all profits earned by ABI from its use

of the Assets it has used pursuant to the Lease Agreement with CBI since November 2008.
C.

For CBI's costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees inculTed in this action. In the

event of default, a reasonably attorneys fee shall be $10,000.
JURY DEMAND
Defendant Kem1eth Rammel, individually and as personal representative of the estate of
Christa Beguesse Rammel, and Defendant/Counterclaimant CBI hereby request a trial by jury on
all issues so triable.
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Dated this (

"b~ay of September, 2009.
RACINE, OLSON, NYE
A1LEY, CHARTE D

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

<;~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thei_U_ day of September, 2009, I served a true, correct
and copy of the above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows:

Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. Avondet
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

J!1 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[] Facsimile (208) 529-9732
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LEASE AGREEMENT

This Lease Agreement (subsequently called ''this Lease") is entered and made effective as
the l't day of January, 2004, by and between, CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho cOiporation,
(subsequently called "Lessor"), and APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, (subsequently
called "Lessee"). This Lease is made upon the terms and conditions subsequently set forth in this
document. In that regard, Lessor and Lessee each agree to observe and perform each and every term
and condition of this Lease, as subsequently set forth in this document, as each such term or
condition relates to each such party.
BUSINESS AND EQUIPMENT. For and in consideration of the promises set forth
in thls Lease and the payment of the rents specified in this Lease, Lessor leases,
demises and rents unto the Lessee, and Lessee leases, demises and rents from Lessor,
that certain business described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto (the "Business"), that
certain equipment described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto. (Such business and
equipment identified in Exhibits "A" and "B'', shall collectively be referred to herein
as "the Property", unless otherwise indicated.)

1.

TERM. Lessee shall have and hold the Property, together with any other

· 2.

appurtenances, privileges, rights and easements belonging to the Property, or in any
way appertaining to the Property, for a term of eight (8) consecutive years
------------·-commencing on January I, 2004, and continuing until midnight on December 31,
2011.
3.

POSSESSION. Lessee shall be entitled to possession of the Property on January 1,
2004. Prior to taking possession of the Property, Lessee shall pay Lessor the first
month's rental installment as subsequently identified and described below, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties herein.

4.

RENT. As rental for the Property, Lessee shall pay the following:
A.

B.

1~

BASE RENT. Lessee shall pay Lessor rent in the amount of Twelve
Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) per month .. Each such monthly rental amount
shall be payable in advance, beginning on the last day of January, 2004, and
continuing on the last day of each successive month thereafter, for 96 months,
until the expiration of the tenn of this Lease, on December 31, 20 I 1, all as
adjusted from year to year as subsequently provided in this Lease. Lessor
may assess a l~te fee on any payment made after the ]ast day of the month in
which the payment is due. The amount of the late fee shall be equa] to 5% of
the late payment.
ADDITIONAL RENT. This Lease allocates a11 responsibility to Lessee for
provision and payment of all "operating costs" as subsequently identified and
described in this Lease. In that regard, if any such "operating costs" are paid
or incurred by Lessor at a...v time during this Lease, Lessee shall pay or
reimburse to Lessor as additionaLrent.all such "operating costs" so paid or
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EXHIBIT

A

incurred by Lessor. Lessor shall give Lessee ten days notice of any
unexpected "operating costs".
"Operating Costs" Defined. For the purpose of this Lease, the tenn,
"operating costs", shall include all costs of operation, management,
and maintenance ofthe Property. The term, "operating costs", shall
specifically include the following costs, by way of illustrations, but
not by way of limitation, as they relate to the Property:

1.

a.

licenses, documents, credit repor1s, permits, inspection fees,
and financial statements;

b.

all taxes, (income, excise, property, withholdings and any
other taxes that become due and owing as a result of the
Property);
·

c.

any costs or fees imposed upon the Property for any reason
whatsoever;
·

d.

in the event Lessee fails to repair and maintain the Property in
a timely manner, as provided in this Agreement, and in the
event Lessor hires personnel to repair or maintain the Property,
Lessee agrees to reimburse Lessor for wages, salaries and
· employees benefits of personnel engaged in operation and
maintenance of the Property;

e.

supplies, materials, office equipment, property and tools; and

f.
any and all expenses related to the operation and management
of the Business;

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, Lessee may replace
any obsolete equipment, provided however that Lessee ls responsible
for the payment of any and all costs arising out of said replacement.
Said replaced equipment shall at all times be, and remain, the property
of the Lessor.
C.

PLACE OF PAYMENT. Lessee specifically acknowledges that all rental
payments due under this Lease, including any late fees, shall be made or
delivered to Lessor at Lessors place ofbusiness or at such other place as
Lessor may designate in writing from time to time. The failure of Lessee to
pay the full amount of the· Base Rent and ali other rental payments, including
without limitation any additional rent and adjusted rent as previously
identified and described, each month as the same comes due shall constitute a
material breach of this Lease and a default under this Lease.
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COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS. The Property shall not be used for any unlawful
purpose during the term of this Lease. Lessee shall comply with all federal, state,
county and city ordinances, Laws and regulations, present or future, affecting the use
of, or the type the Property. Likewise, compliance with any contracts affecting or
relating to the Property.

5.

MAINTENANCE. Lessee shall at all times from and after delivery of possession of
the Property to Lessee (at Lessee's own cost and expense) maintain, repair and/or
replace (subsequently called "maintenance") in good and rentable condition the
Property and every pari thereof. Such maintenance shall be performed by Lessee in a
good and workmanlike manner. Lessee shall also perform such items of
maintenance or improvement to the Property as may at any time be required by any
government agency or private company having jurisdiction over the Property.

6.

7.

NO OBLIGATION OR LIABILITY. Nothing in this Lease shall imply any duty
on the part of the Lessor to do any maintenance or work under any provision of this
Lease that the Lessee may be required to do, nor shall it constitute a waiver of
. Lessee's breach or default in failing to do the same. No exercise by the Lessor of any
rights in this Lease shall entitle Lessee to any damages for any injury or
inconvenience occasioned thereby, not to any abatement of rent Once again, in the
event that Lessor makes or causes any such repairs to be made or performed, as
previously provided herein, Lessee shall pay the cost thereof to Lessor, forthwith, as
additional rent upon receipt of a bill therefore.

8.

WASTE. Lessee shall not commit any waste or damage to the Property, nor permit
any waste or damage to be done to the Property.

9.

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY. Except with respect to any maintenance
obligations expressly assumed by Lessor in this Lease, Lessee shall maintain the
Property in as good condition as the Property is when Lessee takes possession of the
Property, reasonable wear and tear excepted. At the termination of this Lease in any
manner, Lessee shall surrender the Property to Lessor in the condition described·
above.

I 0.

INSURANCE.
A

B.

LESSEE'S OBLIGATION. Lessee shall maintain, and pay for, adequate fire
and extended coverage insurance upon the Property. Lessee shall maintain all
such policies in force during the term of this Lease and shall provide Lessor
with copies of ali certificates of insurance or other satisfacto.ry evidence of
insurance at the beginning of the term prior to taking possession of the
Property and at any other subsequent time requested by Lessor.

WAIVER OF SUBROGATION. Lessee waives any and all rights of
recovery against Lessor's managers, members, employees, agents,
representatives and insurers for Ioss of damage to Lessee's property insured
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under a standard fire insurance policy with all permissible extension
endorsements covering additional perils or under any other policy or
insurance carried by Lessee in lieu thereof.
II.

ACCEPTAl';fCE OF PROPERTY. Lessee has thoroughly inspected the Property
prior to executing this Lease> and as a result of that inspection} Lessee accept the
Property in their present condition and consider the same to be in a state of good
repair. Nevertheless, Lessee shall pay for all cost increased caused by any such
variations in the form of adjusted rents as previously identified and described in the
Lease.

12.

NON-LIABILITY OF LESSOR. As part of the consideration for this Lease,
Lessor shall not be Liable for any injury or damage which may be sustained by the
person or property of Lessee, or any other persons .or property, resulting from the
condition of the Property, or any part thereof, latent or otherwise.
LESSOR'S DISCLAJMER. EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED IN THIS
LEASE, LESSOR DISCLAIMS ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES RELATING TO
THE PROPERTY, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
FI1NESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF COMMERCIAL OR PROFESSIONAL HABITABILITY. BY SIGNING TIUS
LEASE, LESSEE ACCEPTS THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LESSOR'S
DISCLAIMER.

13.

t4.

TIME OF ESSENCE. Time and strict and faithful performance of each and every
one of the conditions ofthis Lease is expressly made the essence of this Lease.

15.

DEFAULT. Lessor shall have the following remedies:

A

B.

4-

Default in Rents or Other Provisions. If Lessee fails to pay off any part of the
rents under this Lease when such rents are due, or if Lessee fails to keep,
perform or observe any of the conditions or terms contained in this Lease, and
such default in payment or performance remains for a period of thirty (30)
days after written notice shaH have been sent by certified mail to Lessee, then
and in such event, Lessor, at Lessor's election, may declare the term of this
Lease ended and this Lease forfeited, and Lessor may enter Lessee's principal
place of business to repossess and enjoy the Property.
Additional Remedies. The remedies set forth in this Lease shall be
. considered optional remedies and not a waiver of any right or remedy that
Lessor would otherwise have at law or in equity to enforce the performance
of this Lease or to recover damages for breach of any condition or term of this
Lease or for default of any promise under this Lease.
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C.

16.

Default Waiver. A waiver of any default or breach of any term ofthis Lease
by Lessor shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any other default or breach of
the same term or of any other term of this Lease. All waivers must be in
writing and be signed by Lessor.

LESSOR'S RIGHT TO CURE LESSEE'S DEFAULTS. IfLesseeshaU breach
any condition or term, or default in the performance of any promise, in this Lease
required to be performed by Lessee, the Lessor may, after thirty (30) days written
notice to Lessee, in which event Lessee shall reimburse Lessor for all sums paid to
effect such cure, together with interest and a reasonable attorney's fees. In order to
collect such reimbursement, Lessor shall have all the remedies available under this
Lease for a default in the payment of rents, and the provisions of this paragraph shall
survive the termination of this Lease. Nothing in this paragraph provided shall in any
way require Lessor to perform any such condition or term or correct any such default
on the part of Lessee.

17.

ATTORNEYS FEES. In the event suit is brought to enforce any of the terms and
_conditions ofthis Lease, then the successful party to such suit shall be entitled to
recover reasonable attorney's fees, together with such other legal costs as may be
·authorized by law.

18.

INTEREST. Any right of Lessor to "interest" from Lessee as allowed or indicated
in this Lease shall accrue at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum, unless
otherwise specificaiiy stated in the context of this Lease.

19.

NOTICES. All notices required to be given to Lessee under this Lease shall be
given by depositing a copy of such notice in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to Lessee at Lessee's principal
place ofbusiness, or to such other address as the Lessee shall direct by a writing
delivered to the Lessor. Such notice may be given by depositing a copy of such
notice in the United States main, postage prepaid by regular mail at said address if
Lessee refuses to sign the return receipt requested.

20.

MODIFICATION. This Lease contains 1the entire agreement between Lessor and
Lessee and the provisions of this Lease may not be modified or changed orally, but
only by an agreement in writing and signed by Lessor and Lessee .

. 21.

BINDING ON SUCCESSORS. The provisions in this Lease, and any extensions
thereof, shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, their heirs persona1
representatives, successors and assigns in interest of both Lessor and Lessee.
Nothing contained in this provision shall negate the prohibition of assignment by
Lessee without Lessor's approval as specified if Section 31 of this Lease.

22.

SUBORDINATION. This Lease shall be subject to, and subordinate and inferior to,
at all times, the lien of any mortgage, any deed oftrust, or any other method of
financing or refinancing now or hereafter existing against all or any part of the
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Property, including without limitation any renewals, modifications; replacements,
consolidations and extensions of any of the foregoing methods of financing. Lessee
shall execute and deliver to Lessor or any other person designated by Lessor all
documents requested by Lessor, or by any mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or other
security holder of Lessor holding a security interest in the Property or lending funds
to Lessor with an expectation of acquiring a security interest in the Property, to effect
such subordination, including any construction financing. Lessee's failure to execute
and deliver such documentation shaH constitute a default under this Lease.
23.

A.

Any entity signing this Lease has been legaHy fanned, is in good standing
under the laws of the State ofidaho, and has all powers necessary to approve
ofthls transaction.

B.

Each person signing this Lease on behalf of such entity is duly authorized by
such entity to do so.

C.

No entity signing this Lease is subject to any charter, bylaws, shareholder's
agreement, partnership agreement, operating agreement, mortg~ge, deed of
trust, contract, lien, lease, judgement or other requirement or document,
including any amendments thereto, which prevents the consummation of this
transaction, or if there are any such things, then such things shall be removed
or the appropriate consents obtained prior to signing this Lease.

24.

IDAHO LAW GOVERNS. This Lease shall be governed by, and construed and
enforced in accordance with, the laws of the State ofidaho.

25.

CONSULTATION. Lessor hereby agrees to provide consultation regarding the
operation and management of the Property, to Lessee> as needed during the term of
this Lease.

26.

ACCOUNTING. Lessee shall provide to Lessor a quarterly accounting of the
Business. Each quarterly accounting, which shall cover the prior quarterly period,
shall be provided to Lessor within thefirst week of the quarter (for example: the first
quarter accounting shall be due on or before the first week of April; the second
quarter accounting shall be due on or before the first week of July; the third quarter
accounting shall be due on or before the first week of October; and the fourth quarter
accounting shall be due on or before the first week of January).

27.

6-

SIGNATURE AUTHORITY. Lessor and Lessee each make the following
representations to each other to the extent they are applicable:

ASSIGNMENT. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, Lessee may not
assign or sublet its rights, duties, or obligations under this Lease Agreement without
first re:ceiving the written consent of Lessor, which may be unreasonably withheld.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set thei~: hands and seals making this
Lease effective as of the date and year first written in this Lease.
Lessee:

Lessor:
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC.

By:

~

~

051
7-
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
STATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss.
. )~

County of Bonneville

.&yo~,

.

On this
in the year 2004, before me, a Notary Public, personally
appeared Christa Beguesse Rammell, known or identified to me, to be the managers ofCHRJSTA
BEGUESSE, fNC., the corporation who executed the instrument or the person who executed the
instrument on behalfofCHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., and acknowledged to me that CHRISTA
BEGUESSE, executed the same.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
STATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss.
~

County of Bonneville

'-1---/--

thisl-,~y ~ar

0n
2004, before me, a Notary Public, personally
appeared APiJt'BEGUESSE):nown or identified to me, to be the President of APRIL
BEGUESSE, INC., the corporation who executed the instrument or the person who executed the
instnunent on behalf of APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., and acknowledged to me that APRIL
BEGUESSE, INC., executed the same.
W WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the day
and year in this certificate first above written.
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EXHIBIT" A"

BUSINESS
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EXHIBIT ''B''
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EXHIBIT "B"
EQUIPMENT
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: j etT@beardstclair.corn
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorneys fbr Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
PlaintiftYCounterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-09-2767

vs.
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Ketmeth
Ranunell,

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC.'S,
COUNTERCLAIM

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), by and through counsel of
record, denies all allegations of Defendant/Counterclaimant, Christa Beguesse, Inc.'s
(CBI), Counterclaim not expressly admitted herein and more specifically responds as
follows:
1.

ABI does not have sufficient infonnation to admit or deny paragraph 1, and

therefore denies paragraph 1.
2.

ABI denies paragraph 2.

Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant, Christa Beguesse, Inc.'s, Counterclaim
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3.

ABI admits paragraph 3.

4.

ABI admits paragraph 4.

5.

ABI does not have sufficient infom1ation to admit or deny paragraph 1, and

3 i8

therefore denies paragraph 5.
6.

ABI denies paragraph 6.

7.

ABI denies paragraph 7.

8.

ABI admits that it has not made a payment to CBr since December 2008

denies the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 8.
9.

ABI denies paragraph 9.

10.

ABI denies paragraph 10.

11.

ABI incorporates its responses to paragraphs I through 10.

12.

ABI denies paragraph 12.

13.

ABI denies paragraph 13.

14.

ABI denies paragraph 14.

15.

ABI incorporates its responses to paragraphs I through 14.

16.

ABI denies paragraph 16.

17.

ABI denies paragraph I 7.

18.

ABI denies paragraph 18.

19.

ABI denies paragraph 19.

20.

ABI incorporates its response.."! to paragraphs I through 19.

21.

ABI denies paragraph 21.

22.

ABI denies paragraph 22.

23.

ABI denies paragraph 23.

24.

ABI denies paragraph 24.

Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant, Christa Beguesse, Inc.'s, Counterclaim
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25.
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ABI denies paragraph 25.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
ABI asserts the following affinnative defenses:
1.

The Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2.

CBI's claims are ban·ed due to fraud.

3.

CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel.

4.

CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine oflaches.

5.

CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

6.

CBl's claims are barred because CBI's damages, if any, were caused by

CBI's own conduct.
7.

CBI has failed to mitigate its damages.

8.

CBI's claims are bmTed because ABI's conduct is not the proximate cause

of any loss suffered by CBI, if any.
9.

CBI has no damages.

10.

CBl's claims are subject to offsets.

11.

CBI's claims are bmred by the doctrine of waiver.

12.

CBI's claims are ban·ed by the failure of consideration.

13.

CBI's claims are barred by the lack of consideration.

14.

If CBI has been damaged, then those damages are a result of CBI's own

conduct.
15.

CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of mutual mistake.

16.

CBI's claims are barred by an implied in fact contract.

17.

CB I' s claims are barred by an implied in law contract.
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CBI' s claims are batTed based on its own breach of contract including the

implied covenant of good faith and .fhir dealing.
19.

CBI' s claims are ban·ed based on lack of mutual assent.

20.

CBI's claims are barred based on its own breach of express and implied

warranties.
21.

CBI's claims are barred based on the claims and facts set forth in ABI's

Com plaint against CHI, Kenneth Rammell, and the Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammel!.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, ABJ demands judgment:
1.

Dismissing CBI's Counterclaim in its entirety;

2.

Awarding ABl's reasonable attomeys' fees, costs and disbursements of

defending this action pursuant to, Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121, Rule 54 oflhe Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, any contract, and any other rule or provision; and
3.

Granting such other and further relief as the Co uti deems just and proper.

DATED: October 8, 2009.
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OfBeard S{. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1certify t11at I am an attomey licensed in the State of Idaho, have my ot1!ce
located in Idaho Falls, Idaho and on October 8, 2009, I ser·ved a true <L11d correct copy of
the Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant, Christa Beguesse, Inc's, Counterclaim upon the
following as indicated below:
David E. Alexander
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-139
Fax: 232-6109

El·

Hand-Delivered

ra/
..
····· FacsJmile

Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 529-1300

[J; U.S. f\-1ail [J;. Hand-Delivered

[~J(:.:·simile

U.S. Mail

o'

Attorney for Plaintiff
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com

11.11 .., r-

1\, \

·l.J

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-09-2767

vs.
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammell,

PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

This matter having come before the Court by means of the Stipulation for Entry of
Protective Order executed by the parties, and good cause having been found:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall not release, disclose, or
otherwise cause to be released or disclosed Plaintiffs customer information, financial
information, tax information, and other confidential business information, to any person
not a party to the pending action between Plaintiff and the Defendants or to any person

61A

not an expert witness in the above action, and shall use such information solely for the
purposes of this litigation.
DATED: December

l , 2009.

61 B

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certifY that on December

j_, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the

Protective Order upon the following as indicated below:
David E. Alexander
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-139
Fax:232-6109
Jeffrey D. Brunson
Beard St. Clair Gafiney
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732

[]}/U.S. Ma1l. 0· · ·

Hand-Delivered

0•

Facsimile

0;

Hand-Delivered

0.

Facsimile

'U.S. Mail

Clerk of the Court
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Jeffrey D. Bmnson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Case No.: CV-09-2767
Plaintiff,
vs.
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The
Estate of Christa Beguesse Ramrnell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammell,

ORDER TO AMEND PLEADINGS

Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court by means of the Stipulation to Amend
Pleadings executed by the parties, and good cause having been found:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
I. Plaintiff may file its First Amended Complaint attached to its Motion to Amend
filed contemporaneously with this stipulation.
2. Defendants may file their First Amended Counterclaim attached to their motion
for leave to file amended counterclaim filed with the Court January 8, 201 0_

61 D
Order to Amencl Ple<1clina'

nwP '

DATED: February

j__, 2010.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certifY that on February

i D, 2010, I served a true and c~rrect copy of the Order

to Amend Pleadings upon the following as indicated below:
David E. Alexander
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-139
Fax: 232-6109
Jeffrey D. Brunson
Beard St. Clair Gaffney
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732

rn( U.S. Mail Q;

Hand-Delivered []' Facsimile

~.S. Mail

Hand-Delivered

[J

Q

Facsimile

Clerk of the Court
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-09-2767

vs.
Kem1eth Rarnmell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammel!,

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
JURY DEMAND

Defendants.

Plaintiff, April Beguesse, Inc., through its attorneys, alleges and complains
against the Defendants as follows.

PARTIES
1. April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI) is an Idaho Corporation set up under the laws of
the State of Idaho.
2. Kenneth Rammel! (Rammell) is an individual residing in Bonneville County,
Idaho.
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3. Christa Beguesse, Inc. (CBI) is an Idaho Corporation set up under the laws of
the State of Idaho.
4. The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its personal representative,
Kenneth Rammell, filed an application for informal probate in Bonneville County, Idaho
on March 11, 2009, Case No. CV-09-1682.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code § 5514.
6. Bonneville County is the proper venue for this action under Idaho Code§ 5404.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
7. In November 2001, April Beguesse (April) was contacted by her mother,
Christa Beguesse (Christa), regarding the possibility of April taking over Christa's
business, CBI. April traveled to Idaho Falls to discuss the possibility with Christa and
Rammel I.
8. CBI was in the type setting business.
9. April believed that Christa was the sole owner ofCBI. Christa had been
running her business for years before she married Ranunell.
10. Rammell and Christa were both officers and directors in CBI.
11. Rammell and Christa told April that she could purchase and take over the
business.
12. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI had a guaranteed selfsustaining contract with a customer.
13. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a library of
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand
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proprietary files valued at over $1,000,000.
14. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a proprietary
software program unique to CBI' s business.
15. Rammell and Christa represented that CBI owned intellectual property.
16. Rammell and Christa indicated that they would sell the business for $12,000 a
month for eight years.
17. Rarnmell stated that they were being very generous and that April would be a
fool not to accept the offer.
18. Initially, April worked for CBI as an employee.
19. In November 2003, April formedABI.
20. Both Rarnmell and Christa indicated on many occasions that the assets of CBI
would be left to April when Christa died.
21. In February 2004, ABI commenced making monthly payments to CBI for
$12,000 month.
22. ABI took ownership of all past and current debts of CBI and started operating
the business. ABI paid all the bills including the monthly rent to a third party.
23. ABI purchased all new computers, printers, scanners, phone system, updated
programs and hardware and updated the office furniture.
24. Rammell indicated that he had a contract that his brother had used for his
business that Rammell had altered.
25. Christa had Rarnmell remove a clause in the contract that stated in the case of
Christa's death payments would continue.
26. Rammel! and Christa represented to April that CBI's assets would be
bequeathed to her after Christa died.
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand
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27. Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease after
Christa's death.
28. Rammell and Christa repeatedly made the representations alleged in the
previous paragraphs.
29. Based on the representations ofRammell and Christa, April ultimately signed
a document entitled "lease agreement". The purported agreement is between CBI and
ABI and made effective January 1, 2004.
30. The purported agreement provides:
BUSINESS AND EQUIPMENT. For and in consideration of the promises
set forth in this Lease and the payment of the rents specified in this Lease,
Lessor leases, demises and rents unto the Lessee, and Lessee leases,
demises and rents from Lessor, that certain business described in Exhibit
'A' attached hereto (the 'Business"), that certain equipment described in
Exhibit 'B' attached hereto. (Such business and equipment identified in
Exhibits 'A' and 'B', shall collectively be referred to herein as 'the
Property', unless otherwise indicated.
31. Exhibits A and B attached to the purported agreement were completely blank.
32. The purported agreement required CBI to provide consulting services to ABI.
33. ABI continued making monthly payments to CBI in an amount of$12,000
until November 1, 2008.
34. ABI also paid Christa for consulting and professional services.
35. On November 10, 2008, Christa died.
36. No will was discovered leaving CBI's assets to April.
37. A holographic paragraph was produced by Rammell that states all of Christa's
possessions go to Rammel!.
38. After visiting an attorney after her mother's death, April learned for the first
time that the representations made by Rammell and Christa alleged in the previous

065

paragraphs were false.
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39. There was no guaranteed contract with a major customer. Rather, the
customer could leave at any time.
40. The library referenced by Rammell and Christa is actually owned by the
customer.
41. The referenced proprietary software program was a software program that
could be purchased off the shelf.
42. On March 1, 2009, April moved to Nevada.
43. On March 11, 2009, Rammell applied for informal probate for Christa's estate
in Bonneville County, Idaho, Case No. CV-09-1682.
44. On April13, 2009, Christa's estate on behalf of CBI filed a complaint against

ABI and April individually in Clark County, Nevada, Case No. A587645. The Nevada
complaint seeks to enforce the purported agreement.
45. The Nevada case was dismissed.

COUNT ONE: DECLARATORY RELIEF
46. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.
47. Critical portions to the purported lease contract between ABI and CBI were
left blank.
48. ABI and CBI did not form a lease contract because there was never mutual
assent.
49. ABI and CBI did not form a lease contract because the purported agreement is
missing essential terms.
50. ABI and CBI never contemplated a lease of the business but rather
contemplated a purchase of certain CBI assets.
51. This Court has the power to declare that there is no lease contract between
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ABI and CBI pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201.
52. ABI is an interested person as defined by Idaho Code § 10-1202.
53. This Court should declare that:
a. ABI is under no continuing obligation to make payments to CBI;
b. Monies previously paid by ABI to CBI should be refunded to ABI; and
c. There is no enforceable lease contract between ABI and CBI.
54. Alternatively, the lease contract should be reformed to meet the intent of
parties.
55. To the extent the Court finds an enforceable contract, the contract should be
rescinded due to the defendants' fraudulent conduct and all monies paid should be
refunded.
56. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.
COUNT TWO: FRAUD

57. ABI incorporates

and realleges all previous paragraphs.

58. The defendants acting individually and on behalf of CBI made numerous
representations to ABI and April including but not limited to the following:
a. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI had a guaranteed selfsustaining contract with a major customer.
b. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a library of
proprietary files valued at over $1,000,000.
c. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a proprietary
software program unique to CBI's business.
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d. Rammell and Christa represented that there was intellectual property
unique to CBI.
e. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI' s assets would be
bequeathed to her after Christa died.
f.

Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease
after Christa's death.

59. The defendants failed to disclose that:
a. There was no guaranteed contract and that the major customer could leave
at any time for any reason.
b. The library of proprietary files was in fact owned by the major customer
and not CBI.
c. That the software program utilized by CBI could be purchased off the
shelf.
d. That CBI did not own any intellectual property.
e. That Ramrnell was an owner of CBI.
60. The statements and omissions of the defendants were false.
61. The statements and omissions of the defendants were material.
62. The defendants knew the statements and omissions were false.
63. The defendants intended thatABI rely on the false statements and omissions.
64. ABI and April did not know the statements and omissions were false.
65. ABI relied on the statements and omissions by signing the purported
agreement and by paying $12,000 a month to CBI from February 2004 to November
2008.
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66. Such reliance by ABI was justifiable.
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67. As a result of the defendants' false statements and omissions, ABI has been
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
68. The defendants' conduct constitutes affirmative fraud, fraud by omission, and
fraud in the inducement.
69. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PAin order to protect
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.

COUNT THREE: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
70. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.
71. The defendants and ABI had a relationship of trust and confidence because
Christa, Rammell, and April were members of the same family and CBI and ABI were in
contractual negotiations and ultimately signed an agreement.
72. The defendants breached this relationship of trust and confidence.
73. ABI is not required to establish that the defendants' knew their statement and
omissions were false or that the defendants intended ABI rely on their false statements
and omissions.
74. The defendants conduct constitutes constructive fraud.
75. As a result of the defendants' conduct, ABI has been damaged in an amow1t to
be proven at trial.
76. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idal1o Code §§ 12-120
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.

COUNT FOUR: BREACH OF CONTRACT
77. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.
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78. The defendants promised to sell or assign several assets ofCBI to ABI in
exchange for payment of $12,000/month.
79. These assets include but are not limited to:
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer;
b. a library of proprietary files valued at over a million dollars;
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI's business;
d. other intellectual property.
80. The parties' exchange of promises constitutes a binding contract.
81. ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract and is not in
material breach.
82. The defendants materially breached the contract by failing to provide the
agreed upon assets and failing to provide consulting services required under the contract.
83. The defendants conduct constitutes a failure of consideration.
84. The defendants conduct also constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
85. The defendants' material breaches are the direct and proximate cause of
damages to ABI.
86. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
87. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.

COUNT FIVE: BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY
88. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.
89. ABI and the defendants entered a contract for the sale of CBI' s assets.
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90. ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract.
91. As part of the contract the defendants expressly represented and warranted
that CBI could transfer the following assets:
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer;
b. a library of proprietary files valued at over a million dollars;
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI' s business;
d. other intellectual property.
92. This wananty was a material term of the contract and its breach constitutes a
material breach of the contract.
93. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-312, in every contract for sale there is a
warranty of title that the title is good and its transfer is rightful.
94. Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 28-2-313,28-12-210, any affirmation of fact or
promise made by the seller or lessor to the buyer or lessee, which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.
95. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-313, any description of the goods which is
made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the description.
96. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-12-211, there is a warranty that no other person
holds a claim to or interest in the goods.
97. Contrary to the defendants' warranties, CBI could not transfer the assets
because such assets did not exist or were not owned by CBI and the assets transfened, if
any, did not conform.
98. The breach of warranty is the direct and proximate cause of damages to ABI.
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand
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99. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
100.

ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to

protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.

COUNT SIX: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
101.

ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.

102.

ABI and the defendants entered a contract for the sale of CBI' s assets.

103.

ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract.

104.

As part of the contract the defendants impliedly warranted that CBI could

transfer the following assets:
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer;
b. a library of proprietary files valued at over a million dollars;
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI' s business;
d. other intellectual property.
105.

This warranty was a material term ofthe contract and its breach

constitutes a material breach of the contract.
106.

As part of the contract, the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets

to be transferred would be merchantable, that is to say that it would pass without
objection in the trade under the contract description; that it would be fit for the ordinary
purpose of such goods; and that it would conform to the promises or affirmations of fact
made.
107.

As part of the contract the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets

was fit for a particular purpose, that is to say that the defendants knew the purpose for
which ABI intended it and that the ABI was relying upon the defendants to furnish the
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assets, and warranted thus impliedly warranted that the assets were suitable for that
pmpose.
108.

Contrary to the defendants' warranties, CBI could not transfer the assets

because such assets did not exist or were not owned by CBI and such assets did not
conform or were not suitable for ABI' s purposes.
109.

The breach of warranty is the direct and proximate cause of damages to

110.

ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

111.

ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to

ABI.

protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedme 54, or any other statute or provision.
COUNT SEVEN: UNJUST ENIRCHMENT
112.

ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.

113.

ABI provided a benefit to the defendants by paying $12,000 a month from

February 2004 to November 2008.
114.

Because ABI did not get what was promised, it would be unjust for CBI to

retain the benefit.
115.

As a result of defendants' conduct, ABI has been damaged in an amount to

be proven at trial.
116.

ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to

protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedme 54, or any other statute or provision.
COUNT EIGHT: QUASI-ESTOPPEL
117.

073

ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs.
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The defendants took the position that April would no longer make any

payments after Christa's death.
119.

Christa had Rammell remove a clause in the contract that stated in the case

of Christa's death payments would continue.
120.

Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI's assets would be

bequeathed to her after Christa died.
121.

Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease

after Christa's death.
122.

On November 10, 2008, Christa died.

123.

No will was discovered leaving CBI's assets to April or ABI.

124.

A holographic paragraph was produced by Ramrnell that states all of

Christa's possessions go to Rammell.
125.

ABI relied on the representations to its disadvantage.

126.

It would be unconscionable to allow the defendants to maintain the

inconsistent position that payments were to continue after Christa's death.
127.

The defendants should be estopped from claiming that the payments must

continue.
128.

ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to

protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
1. Judgment against the defendants in an amount to be proven at trial.
2. A declaration that:
a. ABI is under no continuing obligation to make payments to CBI;
b. Monies previously paid by ABI to CBI should be refunded to ABI; and
c. There is no enforceable lease contract between ABI and CBI.
3. An order estopping the defendants from claiming payments should continue.
4. An award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to agreement Idaho Code§§ 12120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision.
5. Any other relief the Court deems just and proper.

PURSUANT TO RULE 38 OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY
Dated: February 17, 2010.

075
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand

Page 14

2085235069

02-17-2010

Beard St. Clair

Beard St. Clair

16116

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I am an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho, have my office
located in Idaho Falls, Idaho and on February 17, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand upon the following as indicated
below:
David E. Alexander
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-139
Fax:232-6109
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 529-1300

1!;11, U.S. Mail

ri51<

ILl~

"""~

U.S. Mail

~-Hand-Delivered ~acsimile
Q Hand-Delivered

~simile
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W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629)
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE,
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208)232-6101
Fax: (208)232-6109
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, ESTATE OF CHRISTA
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by its qualified
personal representative, Kenneth
Rammel!.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-09-2767

ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM,
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

____________________________ )
COME NOW the Defendants, KENNETH RAMMELL individually and as personal
representative of the ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, and CHRISTA
BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, by and through their attorney of record, Marcus W. Nye
of the firm of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, and in response to the Complaint of
the Plaintiff filed herein, admit, deny and allege as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
The Complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against these
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Defendants, and should be dismissed.
SECOND DEFENSE

1.

Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not specifically admitted

2.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 1 though 8 of the Amended

herein.

Complaint.
3.

In response to paragraph 9 ofthe Amended Complaint Defendants deny that "April

believed that Christa was the sole owner of CBI" and admits that Christa had been running her
business for years before she married Rammel!.
4.

Defendants admit the allegations ofparagraphlO of the Amended Complaint.

5.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 11 through 15 of the Amended

Complaint.
6.

In response to paragraph 16 of the Complaint, Defendants state that a contract was

entered into between Christa Beguesse, Inc. and April Beguesse, Inc., the terms of which contract
speak for themselves.
7.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the Complaint.

8.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 20 of the Complaint.

9.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 21 and 22 ofthe Complaint

10.

Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the

allegations of paragraph 23 ofthe Complaint, and therefore deny the same.
11.

Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint.

12.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 25 of the Complaint, and state further
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that the contract speaks for itself.
13.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 of the Complaint.

14.

In response to paragraph 29, Defendants deny that April signed the contract "based

on the representations of Rarnmell and Christa." Defendants admit that April signed a contract
entitled "Lease Agreement" between CBI and ABI, effective January 1, 2004.
15.

In response to paragraphs 30 and 31 of the Complaint, Defendant states that the

alleged contract speaks for itself.
16.

The Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 32 through 37, and specifically

avert that a holographic Will was found.
17.

Defendants deny the allegation of paragraph 38.

18.

In response to paragraph 39 of the Amended Complaint, to the extent that it alleges

the existence of a contract between CBI and a customer, said contract speaks for itself.
19.

In response to paragraph 40 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants deny ever having

made reference to a "library" owned by CBI, or any representations contrary to the facts. To the
extent that this paragraph 40 may make allegations regarding the typesetting working files for the
customer's products, the Defendants deny the allegation that these files are owned by the customer.
20.

Defendants deny the allegations ofparagraph 41 ofthe Amended Complaint.

21.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 42 through 45 of the Amended

Complaint.
COUNT 1: DECLARATORY RELIEF

22.

In response to paragraph 46 of the Amended Complaint, the Defendants restate their

responses to paragraphs 1 through 45.
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23.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 4 7 through 51.

24.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 52 of the Complaint.

25.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 53 to 56 of the Complaint.
COUNT 2: FRAUD

26.

In response to paragraph 57 ofthe Complaint, Defendants restate their responses to

paragraphs 1 through 56.
27.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 58 through 69.
COUNT 3: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD

28.

In response to paragraph 70 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants restate their

responses to paragraphs 1 through 69.
29.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 71 through 76 of the Complaint.
COUNT 4: BREACH OF CONTRACT

30.

In response to paragraph 77 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants restate their

responses to paragraphs 1-76.
31.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 78 and 79.

32.

In response to paragraph 80 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant admits that the

parties entered into a binding contract, pursuant to which the parties performed from January 2004
until November 2008, and that the tenns of the contract speak for themselves.
33.

In response to paragraph 81 of the Amended Complaint. Defendant admits that ABI

substantially performed its obligations under the contract until November 2008, at which time it
ceased performing under the contract, and is currently in material breach thereof.
34.

Defendants deny the allegations of 82 through 87 of the Amended Complaint.
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COUNT 5: BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY

35.

In response to paragraph 88 ofthe Complaint, Defendants restate their responses 1

through 87.
36.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 89 of the Amended Complaint.

37.

In response to paragraph 90, Defendants allege that Plaintiff is now in material breach

of its obligations under the contract.
38.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 91 and 92.

39.

In response to paragraphs 93 through 96 of the Amended Complaint, the Idaho

Statutes referenced therein speak for themselves and are the best evidence of the statutory
requirements. Said paragraphs do not otherwise appear to require a response from the Defendants.
40.

Defendant deny the allegations of paragraphs 97 through 100.
COUNT 6: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY

41.

In response to paragraph 10 1 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants restate their

responses to paragraphs 1 through 100.
42.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 102.

43.

In response to paragraph 103, Defendants admit that ABI substantially performed its

obligations under the contract through November 2008, but since that time is in material breach of
the contract.
44.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 104 through 111.
COUNT 7: UNJUST ENRICHMENT

45.

In response to paragraph 112 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants restate their

responses to paragraphs 1 through 111.
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46.

In response to paragraph 113, Defendants admitthatABI paid Defendants $12,000.00

per month for February 2004 to November 2008. Defendants deny all other allegations of paragraph
113.
47.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 114 through 116 of the Complaint.
COUNT 8: QUASI-ESTOPPEL

48.

In response to paragraph 117 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant restates its

responses to paragraphs 1 through 116.
49.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 118 through 121 of the Amended

Complaint.
50.

Defendants admit the allegation of paragraphs 122 through 123 of the Amended

Complaint.
51.

In response to Paragraph 124 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants aver that a

holographic will was produced.
52.

Defendant deny the allegations of paragraphs 125 through 128 of the Amended

Complaint.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The claims of the Plaintiff are barred by the applicable statutes of frauds, including but not
limited to Idaho Code§ 9-505, § 15-2-701, and§ 28-2-201.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The claims of the Plaintiff are barred by the applicable of statutes of limitations, including
but not limited to I. C. § 5-216, § 5-217, § 5-218, and§§ 15-3-801, et seq.
TIDRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
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Plaintiffs claims for declaratory judgement, fraud, constructive fraud, breach of contract,
breach of express and implied warranties and unjust emichrnent and quasi-estoppel are barred by the
doctrine of laches.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff should be estopped from denying its obligations and duties under the contract.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants expressly disclaimed in the contract all express and implied warranties.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims should be barred by Plaintiffs material breach of the contract at issue in
this matter.
ATTORNEY FEES
Defendants have been required to retain the services of the law firm of Racine, Olson, Nye,
Budge & Bailey, Chtd., and are entitled to a reasonable fee therefor pursuant to Idaho Code,
including, but not limited to, I. C.§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 and paragraph 17 ofthe Lease Agreement
between the parties.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that judgment be entered in this action declaring the
respective rights and duties of the parties, dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice,
awarding the Defendants their reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and granting Defendants such
other and further relief as is just under the circumstances.
COUNTERCLAIM
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COMES NOW, Defendant /Counterclaimant Christa Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation,
by and through counsel, and for its Counterclaim against the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, April
Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho corporation, as follows:
PARTIES & JURISDICTION

1.

Defendant/Counterclaimant Christa Beguesse, Inc. (herein "CBI"), is a corporation

in good standing registered under the laws of the State of Idaho, having its principal place of
business in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho.
2.

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant April Beguesse, Inc. (herein "ABI"), is a corporation in

good standing registered under the laws of the State ofidaho, having its principal place of business
in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho.
3.

The actions, or failures to act, giving rise to this cause of action occurred or should

have occurred in Bonneville County, Idaho.
4.

Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this court.
BACKGROUND

5.

For several years, CBI operated a profitable business and acquired assets for the

operation ofthe business.
6.

On or before January 1, 2004, CBI entered into an agreement with ABI, pursuant to

which ABI agreed to lease the business and assets (collectively "the Assets") from CBI for a period
of eight consecutive years commencing January 1, 2004. The Lease Agreement (herein "the
Agreement") between CBI and ABI required ABI to make rent payments to CBI in the amount of
$12,000 per month, beginning in January 2004 and continuing for ninety-six months, through
December 31, 2011. A true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and
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incorporated herein by reference as if set forth fully
7.

The Agreement provided that the Assets leased to ABI were to be described in

exhibits attached thereto. Even though the parties inadvertently failed to specifically describe the
leased Assets in the exhibits, the parties performed their obligations under the Agreement for a
period of almost 5 years, until November 2008. During the years of performance, ABI used CBI's
Assets, and ABI also made the required lease payments to CBI, thereby establishing through the
parties' conduct and dealings the specific assets that were intended to be the subject of the
Agreement.
8.

ABI has failed or refused to make the rent payments to CBI after November 2008,

despite having been given notice of default. CBI never received payment from ABI for December
2008 or any month thereafter.
9.

Since November 2008, ABI has continued to use CBI' s Assets to operate the business

that was the subject of the Agreement.
10.

On information and belief, since it stopped making the rent payments to CBI, ABI

has continued to make profits from the use of CBI' s Assets.
COUNT I
(Breach of Contract)

11.

CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs ofthis Counterclaim by reference

and incorporates the same as if set forth fully.
12.

The above-described Agreement is a legal and binding contract properly formed

between CBI and ABI.
13.

ABI's failure or refusal to make the rent payments as required by the Agreement is
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a material breach of the Agreement.
14.

CBI has suffered damages, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of ABI's

breach, in the amount of $12,000 per month for unpaid rent, beginning with December 2008 and
continuing until such time as the breach is cured or the lease expires, together with interest accruing
on each payment from the due date at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum.

COUNT II
(Unjust Enrichment)
15.

CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs ofthis Counterclaim by reference

and incorporates the same as if set forth fully.
16.

ABI has remained in possession of and continues to use CBI' s Assets that were the

subject of the lease Agreement even though it has failed to make the rent payments therefor.
17.

ABI continues to derive a valuable economic benefit from its wrongful use of the

CBI's Assets that were the subject of the lease Agreement.
18.

CBI has conferred a benefit upon ABI, which benefit has been appreciated by ABI,

and it would be inequitable for ABI to retain the benefit without payment for the value thereof to
CBI.
19.

ABI has been unjustly enriched and is liable to CBI for the value of the benefit

conferred, in an amount to be established at trial.

COUNT III
(Constructive Trust)
20.

CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs of this Counterclaim by reference

and incorporates the same as if set forth fully.
21.

ABI has remained in possession of and continues to use the Assets that were the
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subject of the Agreement with CBI even though it has failed to make full payment to CBI for those
Assets.
22.

ABI's continued use of the Assets without full payment to CBI is wrongful.

23.

ABI continues to derive an economic benefit from its wrongful use ofthe Assets that

were the subject ofthe Agreement.
24.

CBI has no adequate remedy at law and is entitled to a constructive trust in its favor

for all profits earned by ABI derived from the Assets that were the subject of the Agreement with
CBI and for which ABI has not made full payment.
COUNT IV
(Uniform Trade Secrets Act)

25.

CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs ofthis Counterclaim by reference

and incorporates the same as if set forth fully herein.
26.

The assets given by CBI to Plaintiff ABI in January 2004, included but are not

necessarily limited to its working files, its computer data bases, "scripts" designed for use with the
Adobe Pagemaker type-setting program used by CBI to automate certain common procedures
performed for its customer, the business relationship between CBI and its customer, and know how
concerning the operation and the business relationship. These assets were given to April Beguesse
in confidence by CBI and constitute trade secrets within the meaning of the Idaho Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, Idaho Code §48-801 et seq.
27.

PlaintiffABI misrepresented its intention to pay the amounts specified in the contract

at issue in this case in exchange for the assets ofCBI, and has now obtained control ofthe assets
without paying the agreed-on price, through false and fraudulent means.
28.

Plaintiff ABI has alleged in its Complaint herein that certain of the assets transferred
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to it from CBI are actually the property of its customer, The Rutter Group, Inc., a division of West
Publishing Company. Although it is not the case that the customer owns these assets, the allegation
that such is true is an indication that ABI may consider itself obliged to transfer possession of said
trade secrets on demand by the customer, which would compromise the value of these trade secrets,
to the detriment of Defendant/Counterclaimant CBI. In the alternative, the allegation is made in
furtherance of ABI' s scheme to misappropriate said trade secrets through false and fraudulent means.
29.

The actions of ABI in misrepresenting its intentions, in attempting to obtain control

of CBI' s trade secrets through false and fraudulent means, and in failing to make payments as
required under the contract constitute a misappropriation of trade secrets within the meaning of the
Idaho Trade Secrets Act.
30.

If ABI were to tum over possession of the trade secrets to the customer, ABI would

lose its sole customer and would be unable to make payments required under the contract, which
would cause damage to Defendant CBI.
31.

Plaintiff ABI' s belief that it is obligated to tum possession of the trade secrets over

to the customer threatens the further misappropriation of CBI' s trade secrets.
32.

Misappropriation of the trade secrets has caused and will cause irreparable damage

to Defendant/Counterclaimant CBI.
33.

CBI is entitled to injunctive relief prohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets to

Plaintiffs customer or others who could gain economic benefit from them, pursuant to Idaho Code
§48-802.

34.

CBI is entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the use of misappropriated trade secrets

by Plaintiff ABI, to the extent that the misappropriation continues, or, in the alternative, if
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exceptional circumstances are found, CBI is entitled to an injunction conditioning future use of the
trade secrets upon payment of a reasonable royalty for a sufficient time to ensure full payment of
amounts due CBI in exchange for said trade secrets, pursuant to I.C. §48-802(2).
35.

Defendant/Countclaimant CBI has been damaged by Plaintiff's misappropriation of

trade secrets in the amount of$12,000.00 per month beginning November 1, 2208 and continuing
through the period ofthe contract at issue in this case, together with interest, costs, and attorney's
fees incurred by Defendant.
36.

Plaintiff ABI has been unjustly emiched by its misappropriation of CBI's trade

3 7.

The actions ofPlaintiff ABI in misappropriating CBI' s trade secrets have been willful

secrets.

and malicious, and CBI is entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Idaho Code §48-803(2).
ATTORNEY FEES
38.

CBI has been required to retain the assistance of the law firm Racine, Olson, Nye,

Budge & Bailey, Chartered, to pursue and protect its legal interests related to this matter and is
entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code, including§§ 12-120(3)
and 12-121, and pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Lease Agreement between the parties.
WHEREFORE, CBI prays for judgment against Counterdefendant ABI as follows:
A.

For a money judgment in the amount of $12,000 per month, beginning with

December 2008 through such time as ABI cures its default or is no longer obligated to make
payments under the Lease Agreement; or in the alternative, for the value of the benefit CBI has
conferred upon ABI for which it is unjust for ABI to retain, in an amount to be established at trial;
plus interest thereon from each payment due date at the rate of 8% per annum.
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B.

For a constructive trust in favor of CBI for all profits earned by ABI from its use of

the Assets it received pursuant to the Lease Agreement with CBI since November 2008.
C.

For CBI's costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees incurred in this action.

D.

For an order granting injunctive relief prohibiting ABI from disclosing trade secrets

identified herein to The Rutter Group, West Publishing Company, other customers of ABI, or other
persons who may derive economic value from them;
E.

For an order granting injunctive relief precluding the use ofABI oftrade secrets given

to it by CBI, or, in the alternative, an order finding exceptional circumstances and conditioning
ABI's continued use ofthe trade secrets on payment of a reasonable royalty to CBI for such time as
necessary to pay those amounts due CBI under the contract at issue in this case;
F.

For damages for misappropriation and exemplary damages in an amount to be proven

at trial, pursuant to Idaho Code §48-803;
G.

For Attorney's fees, cost, interest

H.

For further relief as the Court finds just under the circumstances.

JURY DEMAND
Defendant Kenneth Rammel, individually and as personal representative of the estate of
Christa Beguesse Rammel, and Defendant/Counterclaimant CBI hereby request a trial by jury on all
issues so triable.
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Dated this

f(}

day ofMarch, 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.j/Ltf;;y

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of March, 2010, I served a true, correct and
copy of the above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows:

Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. Avondet
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

~.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[] Facsimile (208) 529-9732
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
Jolm M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7 495
Tel: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNE~LLECOUNTYIDAHO

April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-09-2767

vs.
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammel!,

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO
DEFENDANTS' AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIM

Defendants/Counterc!aimants.

Plaintift/Counterdefendant, April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), by and through counsel of
record, denies a:I allegations ofDefendants/Counterclaimants', Kenneth Ranm1ell,
Chtista Beguesse, Inc., The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell (collectively CBl),
Counterclaim not expressly admitted herein and more specifically responds as follows:
I.

ABI does not have sufficient information to admit or deny paragraph l, and

therefore denies paragraph I.
2.

ABI denies paragraph 2.

~\
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1
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3.

ABI admits paragraph 3.

4.

ABI admits paragraph 4.

5.

ABI does not have sufficient infonnation to admit or deny paragraph 5, and

3/7

therefore denies paragraph 5.
6.

ABI denies paragraph 6.

7.

ABI denies paragraph 7.

8.

ABI admits that it has not made a payment to CBI since December 2008

denies the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 8.
9.

ABI denies paragraph 9.

10.

ABI denies paragraph 10.

II.

ABI incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through I 0.

12.

ABI denies paragraph 12.

13.

ABI denies paragraph 13.

14.

ABI denies paragraph 14.

15.

ABI incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through [ 4.

1G.

ABI denies paragraph 16.

17.

ABI denies paragraph 17.

18.

ABI denies paragraph 18.

19.

ABI denies paragraph 19.

20.

AB I incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through 19.

21.

AB I denies paragraph 21.

22.

ABI denies paragraph 22.

23.

ABI denies paragraph 23.

24.

ABI denies paragraph 24.
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25.

ABI incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 though 24.

26.

ABI denies paragraph 26.

27.

ABI denies paragraph 27.

28.

ABI denies paragraph 28.

29.

ABI denies paragraph 29.

30.

ABI denies paragraph 30.

3 1.

ABI denies paragraph 31.

32.

ABI denies paragraph 32.

33.

ABI denies paragraph 33.

34.

ABI denies paragraph 34.

35.

ABI denies paragraph 35.

36.

ABI denies paragraph 36.

3 7.

ABI denies paragraph 37.

38.

ABI denies paragraph 38.

03-29-2010

4/7

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
ABI asserts the following affitmative defenses:

1.

The Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2.

CBI's claims are barred due to fraud.

3.

CBI's claims are baned by the doctrine of estoppel.

4.

CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of laches.

5.

CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

6.

CBI's claims are batTed because CBI's damages, if any, were caused by

CBI's own conduct
7.

CBI has failed to mitigate its damages.

094

2085299732

l p.m.

8.

03-29-2010

517

CBI's claims are barred because ABI's conduct is not the proximate cause

of any loss suffered by CBI, if any.
9.

CBI has no damages.

10.

CBI 's claims are subject to offsets.

11.

CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver.

12.

CBI's claims are barred by the failure of consideration.

13.

CBI' s claims are barred by the lack of consideration.

14.

CBI's claims are barred based on the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, Idaho Code

§ 48-801 et seq.

15.

CBI's Unifonn Trade Secrets Act claim is barred by the applicable statute

of limitations, Idaho Code§ 48-805.
16.

CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of mutual mistake.

17.

CBI' s claims are barred by an implied in fact contract.

18.

CBI's claims are barred by an implied in law contract.

19.

CBI's claims are baJTed based on its own breach of contract including the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

20.

CBI's claims are barred based on lack of mutual assent.

21.

CBI' s claims are barred based on its own breach of express and implied

wananties.
22.

CBI's claims are batTed based on the claims and facts set fmth in ABI's

Amended Complaint against CBI, Kenneth Rammell, and the Estate of Christa Beguesse
Rammel1.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, ABI demands judgment:
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Dismissing CBI's Counterclaim in its entirety;

2.

Awarding ABI's reasonable attorneys' fees, costs aml disbursements of

617

defi:nding this action pursuant to, Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121, Rule 54 of the Idaho

Rules of Civil Procedure, any contract, and any other rule or provision; and
3.

Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED: March 29, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I am an attorney licensed in the State ofldaho, have my oftice
located m Idaho Falls, Idaho and on March 29, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of
the PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM upon
the tollowing as indicated below:
David E. Alexander
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-139
Fax: 232-6109
Bonneville County Comthouse
605 N Capital A venue

EJ·' u.s• "1
r> a1'1

[];
.I
•
d
·· ·• hand-Del!vere

[k](.F
' '
··· · . acsumle

/

[f:]_ U.S. Mail

fq;:

Hand-Delivered

~

Facsimile

Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 529-1300
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
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APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho)
)
corporation,
)
)

Plaintiff,

ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
STATUS CONFERENCE
Case No. CV-09 2767

)

vs.

)

)

KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual )
)
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an
)
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of
)
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by
)
Its qualified personal
)
Representative/ Kenneth
)
Rammell
1

)

Defendants.

)
)

Pursuant to Rule 16,

I.R.C.P.

I

it is hereby ordered that a

status conference be conducted by and between the Court and the
counsel of record in regard to the above-entitled case on April
22, 2010, at 9:00 a.m.
It is further ordered that at least one of the attorneys for
each party participating in said status conference have authority
to enter into stipulations and to make admissions regarding all
matters

that

discussed.

the

parties

(See Rule 16

may

reasonably

(b) and Rule 16

(c)).

anticipate

being

Counsel shall also

be prepared to furnish the Court with available dates for a pretrial conference and trial setting.
The

Plaintiff

is

directed

conference call to the Court.

to

initiate

the

telephone

The telephone number is 529 1350

extension 1340.
Dated this

J\

day of March, 2010
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

_2uL

day of March, 2010, that I

I

mailed or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE
BY

')fftl-4-//
DEPtrrY CLERK

Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. Avondet
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495
W. Marcus W. Nye
David E. Alexander
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391

/
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDtc9IA£PibJ:J;TPJ;:;C.:IhOF
THE
t~ "- ~t.. _;
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho)
)
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

)

ORDER AND NOTICE
SETTING JURY TRIAL
Case No.
CV-09-2767

)

KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by
Its qualified personal
Representative, Kenneth
Rammell,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
the following pre-trial schedule shall govern all proceedings in
this case:

I.
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
A Pre-trial Conference is scheduled
January 11
2011 at 8:30 a.m.
Jury trial is scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on January 25,
2011. Trial may go into a second week.
In that case
the second week of trial will continue on Tuesday/
February 1, 2011.
Dispositive motions must be filed at least 60 days
prior to trial.
Plaintiff(s) expert witness disclosure, including
opinions and conclusions must be filed at least 100
days before trial.
Defendant(s) expert witness
disclosure including opinions and conclusions must be
filed at least 80 days before trial.
All discovery shall be completed 45 days prior to
trial.
The parties and their attorneys shall attend a
mediation session before a qualified attorney mediator
1

ORDER
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c

or district judge selected by the parties. Unless
excused by Mediator, lead trial counsel, the parties
and a representative of any insurer of a party shall
attend the mediation with adequate settlement
authority. Mediation should be completed at least 45
days prior to trial.
II. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall, no
later than three (3) days prior to the pre-trial conference:
1.
2.
3.
4.

File a list of names of persons who may be called to
testify.
File a descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be
offered into evidence
File a brief citing legal authorities upon which the
party relies as to each issue of law to be litigated.
File proposed jury instructions. The parties need not
submit IDJI2 instruction numbers 1.01 through 1.43.
All instructions shall be prepared in accordance with
I.R.C.P.

51(a).

III. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall no later
than seven (7) days before trial:
1.

File any objections to the jury instructions requested
by an opponent specifying the instruction and the
grounds for the objection.

IV.
1.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
Any exhibits or witnesses discovered after the last
required disclosure shall immediately be disclosed to
the court and opposing counsel by filing and service
stating the date upon which the same was discovered.
No witnesses shall testify and no exhibits shall be
admitted into evidence at trial other than those
disclosed 1 listed and submitted to the clerk of the
court in accordance with this order.
On the first day of trial deposit with the clerk of
court all exhibits to be introduced.
Plaintiff shall
pre-mark and staple exhibits in numerical sequence as
outlined in Plaintiff S exhibit list and Defendant's
exhibits shall be pre-marked and stapled in
alphabetical sequence as outlined in Defendant's
exhibit list.
Pages of exhibits shall be stapled, with
a sticker placed on the first page of the actual
exhibit.
This order shall control the course of this action

2.

3.

1

4.
ORDER
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5.

unless modified for good cause shown to prevent
manifest injustice.
The Court may impose appropriate sanctions for
violation of this order.

DATED this

·2 "'2..- day of April, 2010.

ORDER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

~,day

of April, 2010,

I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

Deputy Court Clerk
Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. Avondet
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495
W. Marcus W. Nye
David E. Alexander
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
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Jeni'ey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintitf/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-09-2767

vs.
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammell,

NOTICE REGARDING REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSIONS DEEMED ADMITTED

De fendants/Counterc laimants.

COMES NOW, Plaintif£/Counterdefendant, April Beguesse, Inc., by and through
its counsel of record, Jeffrey D. Brunson, and the law firm of Beard St. Clair Gafthey PA,
and provides notice to this Court and the opposing party that pursuant to LR.C.P. Rules
36(b)(d), Defendants/Counterclaimants failed to respond to the attached Requests for
Admission within the thirty day response period, and thus said Requests for Admissions
are deemed admitted and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant intends to use said admissions at the

time of triaL
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DATED: May 24,2010.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I am an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho, have my office
located in Idaho Falls, Idaho and on May 24, 2010, I served a tme and correct copy of the
NOTICE REGARDING REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS DEEMED ADMITTED upon
the following as indicated below:
/

David E. Alexander
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-139
Fax: 232-6109
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N Capital A venue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 529-1300

GJJ

U.S. Mail

UQ,

Hand-Delivered

/

n

Facsimile

/

ffiJl

U.S. Mail

~~

//

Hand-Delivered

([~· Facsimile
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DIS TRlCT COURT

!1A GISTR ATE DIVISION

Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com

BONNEVILLE COUNTY
IDAHO

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-09-2767

vs.
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammell,

AMENDED PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

This matter having come before the Court by means ofthe Stipulation for
Amended Protective Order executed by the parties, and good cause having been found:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties are to be bound by the provisions of
the Protective Order entered by the Court on December 8, 2009, which prohibits public

-

_...,
'\

disclosure of certain categories of documents and limits use of said \fq;~~!S'.~'I!f !E \DI
information contained therein to this litigation.

I

\ ______ _

8
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The parties are further ordered that the following categories of documents, which
have been previously produced, or which may be exchanged, or produced during this
litigation by the parties in response to discovery requests are protected in that the
documents and information contained therein can be used by the parties for the purpose
of this litigation, and this litigation only, and for no other purpose now or in the future,
and the same shall not be disclosed to any person or to any entity who is not involved or
associated with this litigation as party, witness, or consultant for a party, or as a person
who has prepared or assisted in the preparation of such documents, and/or as a person to
whom document or copy thereof was addressed or delivered, provided any such nonparty witnesses or other such persons to whom disclosure is permissible hereunder must
agree, prior to disclosure, to abide by the terms of the Stipulation and with the protective
orders entered by the Court:
1.

Any and all documents and/or information pertaining to
macros/commands/scripts used by Plaintiff in her business;

2. Any pricing information used by Plaintiff in her business;
3. Any financial infonnation of April Beguesse or April Beguesse, Inc.;
4. Any tax information of April Beguesse or April Beguesse, Inc.;
5. Any wage or other personal financial information of April Beguesse;
6. Any billing records;
7. Any documents and/or information identifYing, discussing, or referring to
clients or customers of April Beguesse, Inc;.
8. Any financial statements of April Beguesse, Inc.;
9. Any documents containing, discussing, or referring to bank accounts, financial
accounts, and/or other financial information;

97 J

10. April Beguesse's social security number.
The parties shall not file with the Court any of the foregoing categories of
documents produced or exchanged until such time as the parties have reconvened with
the Court and obtained further orders regarding the same and/or the parties have
stipulated to the same. The parties may mark such documents intended to be protected by
the terms of this Stipulation and by any related protective order entered by the Court as
"CONFIDENTIAL." Any use of the confidential documents or information subject to
this Stipulation for any purpose other than this litigation shall be a breach of the
Stipulation and any corresponding protective order.
The protective orders entered by the Court are binding upon all of the parties to
this action, the undersigned attorneys for each party, any recipient of the abovereferenced documents and information, and any successor, executor, personal or legal
representative, heir, assignee, employee, or agent over which any party or attorney or
recipient of the documents and information covered by the Stipulation and related
protective order may have control.
In the event that any of the above-referenced documents and/or information
produced or exchanged are disclosed in contravention of this Stipulation and any related
protective order entered by the Court, either willfully or inadvertently, such documents
and information shall not lose their protected status through such disclosure, and the
parties shall take all steps reasonably required to assure their continued confidentiality.
After termination of this case, the provisions of the Stipulation and any related
protective orders entered by the Court shall continue to be binding. The parties agree that
all documents produced pursuant to the foregoing, and any copies, shall be returned to the
producing party at the conclusion of this matter.
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DATEIY.~ f~ 2010.

CLERK'S NOTICE OF ENTRY

I certifY that

on~Jl.

20 I 0, I served a true and correct copy of the Amended

Protective Order upon the following as indicated below:
David E. Alexander
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-139
Fax: 232-6109
Jeffrey D. Brunson
Beard St. Clair Gaffney
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732

rn!

· x U.S. Mail

[l'

~U.S. Mall.

0:·

Hand-Delivered

.

·"" Hand-Delivered

[J
·. "'

[}

Facsimile

..

·· Facstm1le

Clerk of the Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

APRIL BEGUESSE
corporation,

1

BON~EVILLE

INC. , an Idaho )
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No.
CV-09-2767

)

KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC. , an
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by
Its qualified personal
Representative, Kenneth
Rammell,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

On the 8th day of October, 2010, Defendants' motion for
summary judgment and motion to strike, Plaintiff's motion to
strike came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge,
in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
Mr. Jeff Brunson and Mr. John Avondet appeared for and on
behalf of the Plaintiff.
Mr. David Alexander appeared on behalf of the Defendants.
Mr. Alexander presented Defendants' motion for summary
judgment and motion to strike.

Mr. Avondet presented argument in

opposition to the motion for summary judgment.

Mr. Brunson

presented argument in opposition to the motion to st

ke.

Mr.

Alexander presented rebuttal argument.

97 M

The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue a
ision as soon as possible.
Court was thus adjourned.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1

I hereby certify that on the
day of October, 2010, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

Deputy Court Clerk
Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. Avondet
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495

W. Marcus W. Nye
David E. Alexander
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Case No. CV-09-2767
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
vs.
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual,
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified
personal representative, Kem1eth Rammell,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Defendants/Counterclaimant.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The Parties have also moved to strike certain affidavits.

Following the

hearing and oral argument, the Court took the motions under advisement.
I. FACTS
Defendant Kenneth Rammell (Rammell) and Christa Beguesse (Christa) owned
and operated Defendant Christa Beguesse, Inc. (CBI), an Idaho corporation that provided
typesetting services to a single customer, the Rutter Group (Rutter). In November 2001,
Christa and Rammell approached Christa's daughter, April Beguesse (April), with a
proposal to purchase the business. The Parties dispute some of the details of the proposal.
CBI contends that Christa and Rammell "proposed to April that she work for CBI for two
years, learn all aspects of the business, and then taken [sic] over in January 2004, after
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which she would make payments to CBI of $12,000 per month for eight years." Defs'.
Statement of Undisputed Facts, Sept 3, 2010,

~

9. At the end ofthe eight years, "April

would own the business and all of its assets." ld. at

~

16. ABI essentially agrees with

CBI' s version of the proposal, but claims that Christa and Rammell promised the
following additional items: (1) Christa's consulting services for eight years; (2) a library
of files valued at over one million dollars; (3) a guaranteed contractual relationship with
Rutter; (4) proprietary software; and (5) other intellectual property. ABI also alleges that
the monthly payments to CBI were to cease on Christa's death and that Christa was to
leave the business to April as an inheritance.
In January 2002, April moved to Idaho Falls and began working for CBL She
continued working for CBI through 2003. In January 2004, the business was
"transitioned" to Plaintiff April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), an Idaho corporation whollyowned by April, which began paying $12,000 per month to CBL In October 2004,
Christa and April (on behalf of their companies) signed a document titled "Lease
Agreement", which states that it was "entered and made effective as the

1st

day of

January, 2004." The Agreement is structured as a "lease" of property, with "rental"
payments of $12,000 required each month for eight years. The Agreement states that the
property being leased includes the "business" and "equipment" described in exhibits A
and B. However, the exhibits are left completely blank. The Agreement requires CBI to
provide consultation to ABI throughout the lease term. Although the Parties acknowledge
that ABI was to own the business, the Lease Agreement provides that at the end of the
lease period, " . . . the Lesee shall surrender the Property to Lessor
Agreement,~

9.

MEMORANDUM DECISION- 2

"

Lease

Christa passed away in November 2008, at which time ABI ceased making
monthly payments to CBI. April contacted the vice president of Rutter, Linda Diamond
Raznick (Raznick), who informed April that Rutter owned the "library of files" used by
ABI and that Rutter was not contractually obligated in any way to ABL Clu·ista's will left
her entire estate to Rammel!.
ABI filed the instant action against Rammell, CBI and Christa's estate, alleging
the following eight counts: (1) declaratory relief; (2) fraud; (3) constructive fraud; (4)
breach of contract; (5) breach of express warranty; (6) breach of implied warranty; (7)
unjust enrichment; and (8) quasi-estoppeL The Defendants counterclaimed, alleging the
following four counts: (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust emichment; (3) constructive
trust; and (4) violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is only appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). When
considering a motion for summary judgment, any disputed facts are construed in favor of
the nomnoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are
drawn in favor ofthe nonmoving party. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d
695, 697 (2007).

If reasonable minds might come to different conclusions, summary

judgment is inappropriate. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,394,64 P.3d 317,320
(2003).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proving that no
genuine issue of material fact exists. Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 873, 204 P.3d
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508, 513 (2009). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho
225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007). In order to survive a motion for summary judgment,
the nonmoving party must show that there is a triable issue. G & lvf Farms v. Funk

Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P.2d 851, 861 (1991). "[A] complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial." McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 136 Idaho
39, 42, 28 P.3d 380, 383 (200 I), quoting Celotex Cmp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, I 06
S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). The non-moving party's case must be anchored in something
more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
1ssue. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 960,963 (1994).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Motions to Strike.
In support of Defendants' motion, Defendants filed affidavits of Kenneth
Rammell and Pete Masterson. Plaintiff has moved to strike portions of the affidavits.
As to the affidavit of Kem1eth Rammell, the second line

of~

8 will be stricken as

constituting inadmissible hearsay. The remaining motion to strike is denied.
As to the affidavit of Pete Masterson, Plaintiffs motion to strike is denied.
Arguments regarding the content of Masterson's affidavit go to the weight of the
testimony.
Defendants have moved to strike portions of the affidavits of April Beguesse on
the grounds that statements in the affidavit are inconsistent or contrary to deposition
testimony and therefore "sham" testimony. Said motion is denied with the exception
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27 of the affidavit which is wholly inconsistent with the deposition testimony.
Defendants also moved to strike , 46 as being conclusory. The Court agrees and said
paragraph is stricken.
Defendants have also moved to strike portions of the second affidavit of Linda
Raznick as being sham testimony. Defendants' motion is denied with the exception of,
10 which is stricken as being speculative testimony.
Defendants have also moved to strike portions of the affidavit of Don Mazzella.
That motion is denied.
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Declaratory Relief (Count One)
Defendants move the Comi for summary judgment on each of ABI's claims.
Count One of the Amended Complaint seeks relief by way of a declaratory judgment
declaring the Parties' rights or obligations under the alleged contract.
Defendants argue that ABI' s claim for declaratory relief is barred by the statute of
limitations. In making the argument, Defendants attempt to apply statutes of limitations
applicable to contracts. However, a claim for declaratory judgment is not the same as a
breach of contract action.
Idaho Code § 10-1201 provides as follows:
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed. [emphasis added]
The evidence supports an inference that the Parties entered into an ongomg
contract for the purchase of a business. Declaratory judgment as to the construction of an
ongoing contract is appropriate. There is no statute of limitations precluding a claim for
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declaratory judgment as to the alleged contract. Defendants' motion as to Count One is
denied.
2. Fraud (Count Two)
In Count Two of the Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges fraud or constructive
fraud as to an alleged ongoing contract with Rutter, that Plaintiff would be the owner of a
library of files, that Plaintiff would be receiving proprietary software, that Plaintiff would
be receiving other "intellectual property", that Plaintiff would receive a bequeath of the
subject business' assets upon the death of Christa Beguesse, and that Defendants did not
disclose that Rammel! was a part owner of CBI, Inc.
Defendants attack these claims on a number of grounds.
a. Statute of Limitations
Defendants argue that ABI's claims for fraud and constructive fraud are barred by
the statute of limitations.
A three-year statute of limitation for fraud is established by I.C. § 5218(4). The statute does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or
reasonably should have known of the facts constituting the fraud. McCoy
v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991). Application of I.C. § 5218(4) does not depend on when the plaintiff should have been aware that
something was wrong; as used in the statute, "discovery" means the point
in time when the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the
facts constituting the fraud. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 773, 820 P.2d at 368.
Actual knowledge will be inferred if the allegedly aggrieved party could
have discovered the fraud by the exercise of due diligence. Nancy Lee
A1ines, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511 P.2d 828, 829 (1973);
Gerlach v. Schultz, 72 Idaho 507, 514, 244 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1952);
Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 435, 871 P.2d 846, 852
(Ct. App. 1994). The question of when the plaintiff discovered the fraud is
generally a question for the jury and summary judgment on the issue is
only appropriate if there is no factual dispute about when this discovery
occurred. }vfcCoy, 120 Idaho at 774, 820 P.2d at 369.
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~McCorkle

v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 550, 554-555, 112 P.3d 838,

842-843 (Ct. App. 2005).
Here, the Parties dispute when ABI discovered the alleged fraud. There is a
reasonable inference that the allege fraud was only discovered within the three years prior
to the filing of the complaint. Thus, a factual dispute exists and Defendant is not entitled
to summary judgment by way of a statute of limitations.

b. Course of Performance
Defendants argue that "the course of performance indicates that the assets she
received in January 2004 were the assets for which she bargained." Course of
performance is relevant only to the extent it addresses one or more of the elements of
fraud. Any alleged "course of performance" alone does not preclude the fraud allegations.
Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

c. Elements of Fraud
Defendants argue that ABI can not prove each of the elements of fraud with
respect to any of the alleged misrepresentations.
Fraud requires: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity;
(3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the
speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the
falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance;
and (9) resultant injury. Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 226, 46 P.3d
518, 522 (2002) (citing Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 851, 934 P.2d 20,
24 (1997)).

Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362,368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (2005).
Silence may constitute fraud when a duty to disclose exists. G & A1 Farms
v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 5 14, 808 P .2d 85 1 (1991 ); Tusch
Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Bethlahmy v.
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho
91, 390 P.2d 826 (1964). A party may be under a duty to disclose: (1) if
there is a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
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between the two parties; (2) in order to prevent a partial statement of the
facts from being misleading; or (3) if a fact known by one party and not
the other is so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be
voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows that the other does not
know it.
So-wards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000).
i. Library of Files

ABI alleges that CBI represented that it owned a library of files valued at over
one million dollars and that ABI would receive these files when it purchased the
business. Defendants argue that ABI's claim of fraud based on this alleged
misrepresentation fails because the alleged misrepresentation was not false. ABI contends
that because Rutter owns the library of files, CBI' s alleged representation was false.
Defendants rely on the affidavit of Pete Masterson (Masterson) to establish that
ABI owns the library of files. Masterson testified that, absent an agreement to the
contrary, trade custom dictates that the typesetter owns the intermediate files used to
produce the final product for the customer. Masterson concludes that, because ABI and
Rutter do not have an express agreement altering the trade custom, ABI owns the library
of files.
ABI presented the affidavit of Don Mazzella (Mazzella) in opposition to
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Mazella' s testimony directly contradicts
Masterson's testimony. Mazella testified that, absent an agreement to the contrary, trade
custom dictates that the customer owns the library of files. Raznick confirmed Mazella's
testimony by stating that Rutter owns the library of files.
Based on the record before the Court on summary judgment, a genuine question
of fact exists as to ownership of the library of files. Consequently, a reasonable inference
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exists that the alleged misrepresentation regarding ownership of the library of files was
false. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

ii. Guaranteed Contract with Rutter
ABI alleges that CBI represented that Rutter was contractually obligated to do
business with CBI and that ABI would own the guaranteed contract when it purchased
the business. Defendants argue that, even if CBI promised a guaranteed contract with
Rutter, ABI can not prove its ignorance of the falsity of that statement.
Although the record contains testimony from April that CBI promised to transfer
a

guaranteed

contract

with

Rutter,

April's

deposition

testimony

clarifies

her

understanding of the term "contract."
Q.

.. . What I would like to know now is to the best of your memory
right now what was represented to you about a guaranteed
contract? How was that described to you?

A.

It was described to me that

Q.

Bywhom?

A.

Christa and Ken both. We were around the kitchen table. That the
Rutter Group library was owned by Christa Beguesse,
Incorporated. And because of that there was a binding
a
contractual obligation for the Rutter Group to continue to use
Christa and vice versa. It would be vastly too much money a11d
time for them to ever try to reinvent that type of wheel. It was 30
years in the making. And, again, for the meager fee of $12,000 a
month I could buy these :files. And then, like I said, turn around
and sell them either back to the Rutter Group or to a third pmiy.

Q.

That was your guaranteed contract?

A.

I was under the assumption that that was my guaranteed contract,
yes.

Q.

Am I understanding you conectly that you agree there was not a
contract and that the Rutter Group - there was a situation where
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the Rutter Group had no reasonable alternative but to deal with
your mother and therefore with you?
MR. BRUNSON:

I object to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS:

We used, your verbiage, in the form of
contract. What you just said we would say
contract.

Q.

Okay. So is it fair to say, then, that you understood that the Rutter
Group could, if it wanted to, simply take this business in-house or
take it to another vendor, but that it would be prohibitively
expensive for them to do so?

A.

Yes.

ABI depo., pp. 80-81. See also ABI depo. p. 56, 11. 1 19:
The foregoing testimony reveals that even if ABI was promised a guaranteed
contract with Rutter, April understood that no contract existed. April understood that
Rutter was not required by contract to do business with CBI (or ABI), but only that the
companies had a good working relationship and that it would be expensive for Rutter to
take its business elsewhere. ABI knew or should have known that at best, Rutter was, to a
degree, a captive client. Any testimony from April that uses the term "contract" must be
considered in light of her understanding of that term. Affidavits of Plaintiff attempting to
subsequently re-characterize her deposition testimony will not be considered.
Thus, the record establishes that ABI can not prove its ignorance of the falsity of
the alleged statement regarding a guaranteed contract with Rutter. Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment dismissing ABI' s claim for fraud as it relates to this alleged
misrepresentation.

iii. Proprietary Sofnvare
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ABI alleges that CBI represented that CBI owned proprietary software unique to
the typesetting business and that ABI would receive this software when it purchased the
business. The only software that ABI received was PageMaker, which can be purchased
offthe shelfby anyone.
Defendants argue that ABI simply misunderstood the nature of the software that it
was receiving and that it can not form the basis for a fraud action. However, at this stage
in the litigation, an inference exists based on April's testimony that CBI misrepresented
the software that it owned and used. Whether the software used in the business was
proprietary or available to the public would reasonably have an effect on the purchase
price of the business. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this
basis.
IV.

Other Intellectual Property

ABI alleges in its complaint that CBI promised to transfer "other intellectual
property," however, ABI has failed to state what is meant by this phrase (apart from the
library of files and proprietary software). Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment dismissing ABI' s claim for fraud as it relates to this alleged misrepresentation.
v. Payments Ceasing on Christa's Death
ABI alleges that Christa promised to make a will bequeathing the business to
April and that, as a result, payments would cease under the contract when Christa died.
Defendants argue several theories for why this alleged statement can not serve as a basis
for fraud, including statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, and lack of corroborating
evidence. However, these theories would only be applicable if ABI was attempting to
enforce the alleged promise to make a will. Here, ABI is simply alleging fraud.
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Therefore, the statute of frauds, parol evidence rule and lack of corroborating evidence
are not relevant or, at best, only relevant as evidence of whether ABI's reliance was
justified. Nevertheless, an alleged promise to make a will can not be the basis of fraud.
As a general rule, fraud cannot be based upon statements promissory in
nature that relate to future actions or upon the mere failure to perform a
promise or an agreement to do something in the future. Pacific States
Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Addison, 45 Idaho 270, 261 P. 683 (1927). The
allegedly false representation must concern past or existing material facts.
Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 114 P.3d 974 (2005).
We have recognized two exceptions to the general rule that fraud cannot
be based upon the mere failure to perform a promise. One exception is if
the speaker made the promise without any intent to keep it, but to induce
action on the part of the promisee. Pocatello Sec. Trust Co. v. Henry, 35
Idaho 321,206 P. 175 (1922). The second exception is ifthe promise was
accompanied by statements of existing fact which show the promisor's
ability to perform the promise and those statements were false. ld.

Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C, 142 Idaho 671, 673-674, 132 P.3d 428,430431 (2006).
In the case at bar, ABI not only alleges that Christa promised to bequeath the
business to April, but that Christa's will already spelled out the details. That Christa and
Rammell allegedly misrepresented existing facts concerning Christa's will implicates the
second exception to the general rule set forth in Gillespie. Consequently, the Court finds
that, based on the record, an inference exists that would support ABI's fraud claim as it
relates to the alleged statement about payments ceasing on Christa's death.
Defendants also contend that the parol evidence rule and statute of frauds prevent
ABI from recovering on this portion of its fraud claim. While these theories may be
relevant if ABI were attempting to enforce the alleged promise to bequeath the business,
the Court finds that they are not dispositive on the issue of fraud. Gillespie v. Mountain

Park Estates, L.L.C, 138 Idaho 27, 30, 56 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2002) ("[t]he parol evidence

lO~J
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rule does not apply to averments of fraud, misrepresentation, mutual mistake or other
matters which render a contract void or voidable."); Idaho Falls Bonded Produce and

Supply Co. v. General A1ills Restaurant Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 50, 665 P .2d 1056,
1060 (1983) (Bistline, J., concurring) ("[C]ourts will not apply the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds when to do so would work a fraud.").
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that genuine questions of fact exist on
Plaintiff's claim for fraud as it relates to the alleged statement about payments ceasing on
Christa's death. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this
part of Plaintiff's fraud claim.

vi. Rammell's Ownership Interest
Defendants' initial motion and argument does not address the claim of fraud by
nondisclosure of Rammell' s ownership interest in CBI. Accordingly, the Court will not
address that issue.
3. Constructive Fraud (Count three)
Defendants seek a summary dismissal of Count Three of the Amended Complaint
which is denominated as a claim for "Constructive Fraud".

The claim alleges

constructive fraud based upon a relationship of trust and confidence. However, the claim
does not set out any factual allegations as to what constituted the alleged fraud. Pursuant
to Rule 9(b ), IRCP, the facts or circumstances of an alleged fraud must be stated with
pmiicularity.
Accordingly, Defendants motion as to Count Three will be granted. This ruling
does not apply to the allegation in Count Two regarding the alleged nondisclosure of
Rammell's interest in CBI, which is technically a constructive fraud allegation.
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4. Breach of Contract (Count Four)
ABI alleges that CBI breached the Agreement by failing to provide the following
assets: (1) a library of files worth over one million dollars; (2) a guaranteed contract with
Rutter; (3) a proprietary software program; and (4) other intellectual property. ABI also
alleges that CBI breached the contract by failing to provide consulting services after
Christa died.
Defendants first argue that the breach of contract claim is barred by the statute of
limitations.

While a lease agreement might implicate I.C. § 28-12-506, the "Lease

Agreement" which is an exhibit in this matter bares little resemblance to what the Pmiies
agree was the contract.

Specifically, there was no lease but rather the purchase of a

business. 1 The subject Lease Agreement was a sham contract for the purpose of avoiding
tax consequences and neither Party intended there to be a lease. As such, the Lease
Agreement is unenforceable: "When two parties enter into a sham contract, as between
themselves, there is no contract and the document is thus unenforceable." 6A A. Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts s 1473 (1962);
The Court finds that the alleged contract in this matter was an oral agreement for
the purchase of a business. The statute of limitations applicable to an oral agreement is
four years under I.C. § 28-2-725 or I.C. § 5-217?

Under both statutes, the statute of

limitations begins to run at the time the cause of action accrues.
a. Guaranteed Contract with Rutter
As previously set out, the evidence does not support an allegation of a guaranteed
contract with Rutter.

Additionally, such a claim for breach of contract would have

1

Portions of the written Lease Agreement may be probative of the tenns and conditions of the oral
agreement
2
All Parties have referred to UCC provisions and consider the transaction to be subject to the UCC
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accrued at the time the business was delivered to ABI, which was more than four years
prior to the filing of the lawsuit.

Farmers National Bank v. Wickham Pipeline,

Construction, 114 Idaho 565, 759 P.2d 71 (1988).
Plaintiff has argued that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should bar the
application of the statute of limitations.
"The only non-statutory bar to a statute of limitation defense in Idaho is
the doctrine of equitable estoppeL" JR. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Jnt'l,
Inc., 126 Idaho 532,534,887 P.2d 1039, 1041 (1994). The elements of
equitable estoppel are as follows:
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel
did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false
representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied
upon; and (4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or
from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the
representation or concealment to his prejudice.

ld Equitable estoppel does not eliminate, toll, or extend the statute of
limitations. Ferro v. Society ofSaint Pius X, 143 Idaho 538, 540, 149 P.3d
813, 815 (2006). It merely bars a party from asserting the statute of
limitations as a defense for a reasonable time after the party asserting
estoppel discovers or reasonably could have discovered the truth. Jd

City ofiv!cCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 663-664, 201 P.3d 629, 636- 637 (2009).
The Court finds equitable estoppel to be inapplicable to this issue. As set out
above, Plaintiff knew of should have known that there was no guaranteed contract with
Rutter when she took over the business. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
this claim.

b. Proprietary Software
A claim that Plaintiff was not provided proprietary software also arose at the time
the business was delivered to Plaintiff and would normally be barred by the four year
statute of limitations. However, there is an inference that Plaintiff did not know that the
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software was not proprietary until late 2006 when the business performed an update to
the PageMaker software. As such, equitable estoppel may apply to prevent the
application of the statute of limitations.

Defendants are not entitled to summary

judgment on this claim.
c. Intellectual Property

There is nothing in the record identifying any other intellectual property that was
to be provided to the Plaintiff as part of the sale of the business. Not only does the
evidence not support such a claim, the claim would also be barred by the four year statute
of limitations.
d. Library Files

As set out above, there is at least an inference supporting Plaintiff's claim that the
agreement included library files worth a substantial amount of money. The cause of
action for this claim did not necessarily accrue at the time of delivery of the business
inasmuch as that time, there was no adverse claim to the files. Courts have held in similar
cases that a cause of action for breach accrues at the time the party becomes aware of an
adverse claim to the property which was purchased under the contract i.e., the alleged
breach does not occur until an adverse claim is made.
A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon breach for
limitations purposes. See Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 830, 11 P.3d
20, 26 (2000); Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 180, 484 P.2d 728, 729
(1971 ). The five-year statute of limitation for Barraza to bring this breach
of contract claim began to run when Barraza became aware of the breach.
The breach alleged in Ban·aza's answer occurred when Cuevas filed the
instant quiet title action-April 2, 2007.
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517, 198 P.3d 740,746 (Idaho App.,2008)

The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claim accrues upon
the breach of the contract. Prewett v. First Nat'! Bank of Hagerman, 45
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Idaho 451,457,262 P. 1057, 1058 (1928). The question ofwhen the
breach occurred is a factual one. Therefore, we look to the record to see if
there is sufficient and competent evidence to support the findings. lvfays v.
Kast, 96 Idaho 472,531 P.2d 234 (1975). The evidence ofthe discovery of
the logging and the listing of the property for sale is ce1iainly a point at
which the Spences were aware their development was not going forward.
Taking the evidence outlined above in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there was substantial evidence to present the issue to the
jury and trom which the jury could find that the Spences' agreement with
Howell was not breached until 1988.
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763,770-771,890 P.2d 714,721 -722 (1995).

In this case, there is evidence that an adverse claim to the files arose within the
four years prior to the filing of the complaint. Additionally, based upon the disputed
evidence equitable estoppel may preclude the application of the statute of limitations to
this claim. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim is
denied.
e. Consulting Services

The Parties agreement regarding consulting services from Christa was an
agreement for future performance, and no breach arises until the time for performance is
to occur. Plaintiff argues that the agreement was breached inasmuch as Christa can not
provide consulting services due to her death.
The death of Christa constitutes and "impossibility" and can not be the basis for a
breach of contract claim.
The common law doctrine of impossibility of performance operates to
excuse a party from liability for nonperformance of his or her obligations
under a contract. See Kessler v. Tortoise Dev., Inc., 130 Idaho 105, 108,
937 P.2d 417, 420 (1997); Haessly v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 121 Idaho 463,
465, 825 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1992); State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 523,
198 P.3d 749, 752 (Ct.App.2008); Ferguson v. City of Orofino, 131 Idaho
190, 193, 953 P.2d 630, 633 (Ct.App.1998). Impossibility is proven by
showing that a contingency occurred, the nonoccurrence of which was a
basic assumption of the agreement and that the contingency made
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performance of the contract impossible. Kessler, 130 Idaho at 108, 937
P.2d at 420; Haessly, 121 Idaho at 465, 825 P.2d at 1121; Chacon, 146
Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752.

State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 2010 WL 1980405, 5 (Idaho App.,20 10).
In addition to the foregoing, there is no evidence that Defendants failed to provide
substitute consulting services upon request of Plaintiff. While Defendants may have an
obligation to provide such substitute services, absent a request and failure to provide such
services, there is no basis to asse1i a breach. The Court does not accept Plaintiffs
argument that no other person could provide adequate consulting as may be required by
Plaintiff.
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
5. Breach of Express Warranty (Count Five) and Implied Warranty (Count Six)
In Count Five and Six of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants warranted that the transfer of assets included a library of proprietary files
worth over one million dollars, a guaranteed contract with Rutter, proprietary software
program, and other intellectual property. These warranty claims are subject to the same
analysis as set out above.

Warranty claims are further subject to the same four year

statute of limitations. Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 824, 979 P.2d 1174,
1182 (1999).
Again, a warranty claim as to a guaranteed contract is not supported by the
evidence and barred by the statute of limitations. Disputed issues of fact preclude
summary judgment as to the alleged proprietary software. The evidence does not support
a claim as to "other intellectual property" and in any event, such a claim is baned by the
four year statute of limitations. The claim as to a library of proprietary files is not as a

115
MEMORANDUM DECISION- 18

matter of law barred by the statute of limitations. Additionally, disputed issues of fact
preclude summary judgment on that claim.
Accordingly, as to Counts Five and Six, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment in part.
6. Unjust Enrichment (Count Seven)
Plaintiff argues that it would be unjust for Defendants to retain the payments
made for the purchase of the business in that Plaintiff did not receive what she was
"promised". Unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy that may be available to a party
when there is no adequate remedy at law.
Unjust emichment occurs where a defendant receives a benefit which
would be inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the
extent that retention is unjust. Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co.,
118 Idaho 463,466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990) (quoting Hertz v. Fiscus, 98
Idaho 456, 457, 567 P.2d 1, 2 (1977)). A prima facie case of unjust
enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was a benefit conferred
upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of
such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that
would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without
payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal
Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999).
The doctrine of unjust emichment is not permissible where there is an
enforceable express contract between the parties which covers the same
subject matter. Wilhelm v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 152, 30 P.3d 300, 307
(Ct. App. 2001) (citing DBSI/TRI v. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 805, 948 P.2d
151, 160 (1997)). Equity does not intervene when an express contract
prescribes the right to compensation. Shacocass, Inc. v. Arrington Constr.
Co., 116 Idaho 460, 464, 776 P.2d 469, 473 (Ct. App. 1989); see Wolford
v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064,695 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1984).

Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558, 165 P.3d 261, 272 (2007).
Defendants argue that the claim of unjust enrichment is simply a different theory
for the same relief sought in the foregoing actions at law. As referenced above, equitable
remedies are not available when a party has an adequate remedy at law.
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As apparent from the pleadings, legal claims available to Plaintiff included fraud,
breach of contract and breach of warranty. If failure to provide proprietary files, etc.
constitutes a breach of contract, then the trier of fact can ascertain the damages arising
from that breach. Even if an adequate remedy at law becomes barred by a statute of
limitations, an equitable claim of unjust emiclm1ent will not apply. Thomas v. Campbell,
107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984); Farmers Nat. Bank v. Wickham Pipeline
Canst., 114 Idaho 565,759 P.2d 71 (1988). Rather, as long as an adequate remedy at law

existed at some point, an equitable claim will be precluded.
There being adequate remedies at law, unjust emichment is not available as an
alternate theory for the same relief. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this
claim.
7. Quaisi-Estoppel (Count Eight).
ABI alleges that Defendants should be estopped "from taking a position contrary
to their previous position that payments would cease upon Christa's death." Pl.'s Memo.
in Opp. to Mot. for S.J., p. 38. Defendants argue that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel does
not apply in this case.
To prevail on a quasi-estoppel theory, the claimant must show:
(1) the offending pmiy took a different position than his or her
original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other
party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be
unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a
benefit or acquiesced in.
Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 235 P.3d 387, 393 (2010) (quoting Terrazas v.
Blaine County, 147ldaho 193, 200 n. 3, 207 P. 3d 169, 176 n. 3 (2009)).
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As an equitable remedy, quasi-estoppel is not available when there is an adequate
remedy at law.

As set out above, Plaintiff is pursuing a fraud claim based on the

allegation that Defendants represented that an existing will provided that payments would
end upon Christa's death. Since a legal remedy is available on this claim, Plaintiff may
not pursue an equitable claim for quasi estoppel.
8. Defendants' Counterclaims
Defendants also seek summary judgment on their counterclaims seeking relief for
breach of contract, constructive trust, and injunctive relief. Defendants' argument is
primarily based on the claim that Plaintiff has breached the contract by failing to pay
$12,000 a month pursuant to the agreement.
While the evidence establishes that Plaintiff has stopped making the monthly
payment, there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether the non-payment is a breach of
contract. If Plaintiff is successful on the fraud claim, the contract may be considered void
and there would be no breach. Additionally, Plaintiffs claims may be the basis of a
setoff for any recovery of Defendants. 3

Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to

summary judgment on the unjust enrichment or constructive trust claims based on the
disputed issues of fact.
Defendants also seek injunctive relief as to Plaintiff disclosing trade secrets and
proprietary information to its customers or other third parties. Under the circumstances of
the litigation, Defendants have a legitimate interest in preserving such trade secrets. The
Court finds that such injunctive relief is proper during the course of the litigation and all
3

A statute of limitations will not preclude a claim or defense for purposes of a setoff. Even though
affirmative relief on a claim is barred by the statute of limitations, it may be presented defensively as a
setoff against an adverse claim. Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685,687-688,23 P.3d 147, 149-50 (2001);
Hirning v. Webb, 91 Idaho 229,231,419 P.2d 671,673 (1966); Kelson v. Ahlborn, 87 Idaho 519,528,393
P.2d 578, 583 (1964 ); Viehweg v. Thompson, l 03 Idaho 265, 268, 647 P.2d 311, 314 (Ct.App.1982).
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Parties are enjoined from disclosing to third parties trade secrets or proprietary
information ofthe subject business.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Parties motions to strike are granted in part and
denied in part. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in pmi and denied
in part, as set out above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 2_ day ofNovember, 2010.
\
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: jeff@ beardstclair. com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Case No.: CV-09-2767

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
vs.
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammell,

PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED SPECIAL
VERDICT FORM

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

We, the jury, answer the interrogatories in the Verdict Form as follows:
FRAUD
Question No. 1: Did Kenneth Rammell commit fraud, constructive fraud, or
fraud by nondisclosure?
Answer: Yes

No

Question No. 2: Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. commit fraud, constructive fraud, or
fraud by nondisclosure?
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Answer: Yes

No

Question No. 3: Did The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell commit fraud,
constructive fraud, or fraud by nondisclosure?
Answer: Yes

No

Ifyou answered "Yes" to questions 1, 2, or 3, answer Question No.4. Ifyou
answered "No" to questions 1, 2, and 3, proceed to Question No. 5.
Question No.4: What is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately
caused by the fraud, constructive fraud, or fraud by nondisclosure?
Answer:
BREACH OF CONTRACT

Question No.5: Did Kenneth Rammell breach a contract with the Plaintiff?
Answer: Yes

No

Question No. 6: Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach a contract with the Plaintiff?
Answer: Yes

No

Question No. 7: Did The Estate of Christa Beguesse Ran1111ell breach a contract
with the Plaintiff?
Answer: Yes

No

If you answered "Yes" to questions 5, 6, or 7, please answer Question No. 8. If
you answered "No" to questions 5, 6, or 7, then please proceed to Question No. 9.
Question No.8: What is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately
caused by the breaches of contract?
Answer:

Plaintiff's Proposed Special Verdict Form Page 2
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BREACH OF WARRANTY
Question No. 9: Did Kenneth Rammell breach an express or implied warranty
with the Plaintiff?
Answer: Yes

No

Question No. 10: Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach an express or implied
warranty with the Plaintiff?
Answer: Yes

No

Question No. 11: Did The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell breach an express
or implied warranty with the Plaintiff?
Answer: Yes

No

If you answered "Yes" to questions 9, 10, or 11, then please answer Question No.
12. If you answered "No" to questions 9, 10, and 11, then please proceed to Question
No. 13.
Question No. 12: What is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately
caused by the breaches of express or implied warranties?
Answer:

BREACH OF CONTRACT
Question No. 13: Did the Plaintiff breach a contract with the Defendants?
Answer: Yes

No

If you "Yes" to Question No. 13, then please answer Question No. 14. If you
answered "No" to Question No. 13, then please proceed to Question No. 15.
Question No. 14: What is the total amount of damages to Defendants proximately
caused by the breaches of contract by the Plaintiff?
Answer:
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TRADE SECRETS ACT
Question No. 15: Did the Defendants have a trade secret?
Answer: Yes

No

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 15, please proceed to Question No. 16. If
you answered "No" then you are done. Please sign the verdict and inform the bailiff.
Question No. 16: Did the Plaintiffmisappropriate the Defendants' trade secrets in
a wrongful manner?
Answer: Yes

No

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 16, please proceed to Question No. 17. If
you answered "No" to Question No. 16 then you are done. Please sign the verdict and
inform the bailiff.
Question No. 17: Did the Plaintiff's misappropriation ofthe Defendants' trade
secrets proximately harm the Defendants?
Answer: Yes

No

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 17, please proceed to Question No. 18. If
you answered "No" to Question No. 17 then you are done. Please sign the verdict and
inform the bailiff.
Question No. 18: What is the total amount of damages caused to the Defendants
by the Plaintiffs misappropriation of the Defendants' trade secrets?
Answer:
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DATED: January __, 2011

Jury Foreperson
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-09-2767

vs.
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
Rammell,

PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record, Jeffrey D.
Brunson and the law firm, Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, and submits the following
proposed jury instructions.
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IDJI 1.20.1

Burden of proof- preponderance of evidence
INSTRUCTION NO. 1
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or

use the expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be
persuaded that the proposition is more probably true than not true.

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction

/

Given - - Refused

Modified

Covered

Other - -
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2
One of the named defendants in this case is The Estate of Christa Beguesse
Rammell. Statements made by Christa Beguesse Rammell are attributable to
The Estate of Christa Begue sse Rammell for purposes of this trial.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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IDJI 1.20.2- Burden of proof- clear and convincing evidence
INSTRUCTION NO. 3
W'hen I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear
and convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly
probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher burden than the
general burden that the proposition is more probably true than not true.

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction

/

Given - - Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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IDJI 1.22 - Deposition testimony (Modified)
INSTRUCTION NO.4
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A
deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in
writing. This evidence is entitled to the same consideration you would give
had the witness testified from the witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is
a record of the testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be
available to you during yom deliberations.
Comment:
The last sentence has been added to IDJI 124 to anticipate inquiry from the jury.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

/

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other

12f~

IDJI 1.24.1

Circumstantial evidence without definition
INSTRUCTION NO. 5
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no

distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a
reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such convincing force
as it may cany.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

I

Refused

Modified

Covered - - - Other
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IDJI 1.28

Evidence admitted for limited purpose

INSTRUCTION NO. 6
In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I called your
attention to this when the evidence was admitted. I remind you that whenever evidence
was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose
other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted.

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given J

Refused

Modified

Covered - - Other
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IDJI 4.60- Fraud - issues
INSTRUCTION NO. 7

The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
propositions by clear and convincing evidence:
1.

That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

The defendant either knew the statement was false or was

unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement was
made.
5.

The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false;

6.

The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the

statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated;
7.

The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the

circumstances;
9.

The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by

reliance on the false statement.
10.

The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the

amount thereof.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the
elements of traud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then
your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this issue. If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has
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not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should
be for the defendant.
Comment:
A definition of materiality can be found in IDJI 6.08 .5.
See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, P.2d 303
(2000); Watts v. Krebbs, 131 Idaho 616,962 P.2d 387 (1998); Magic Lantern Prods. Inc.
v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805, 892 P.2d 480 (1995).
See also, Witt v. Jones, Ill Idao 477, 722 P.2d 474 (1986); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106
Idaho 700,682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Fawv. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387,613 P.2d 1338
(1980); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331 597 P.2d 217 (1979); King v. McNeel, Inc., 94
Idaho 444, 489 P.2d 1324.

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given - - ' < - - - Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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IDJI 6.0 1.1 -Elements of contract- introductory (Modified)
INSTRUCTION NO.8
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do
something that is supported by consideration.
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have
these four elements. The four elements are:
1.

Competent parties;

2.

A lawful purpose;

3.

Valid consideration; and

4.

Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms.

Comment:
The committee recommends that this instruction be used only where the
jury actually needs a "lecture on contracts" The detailed instruction should usually
be unnecessary, as only specific issues in dispute need be covered.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given - - - Refused

/

Modified

Covered - - Other
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IDJI 6.05.2- Material tem1s- offer and acceptance (Modified)
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
A contract may consist of an offer by one party that is accepted by
another party.

An offer is any proposal that is intended to become binding upon the
party making the offer if it is accepted by the party to whom it is directed.

An acceptance of an offer is an expression by the pmiy to whom the
offer was directed that accepts the offer in accordance with the terms of the
offer.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given - - Refused

/

Modified

Covered - - Other
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IDJI 6.06.1 -Contract may be written or oral
INSTRUCTION NO. 10
A contract may be written or oral, or may contain both written tenns
and oral tem1s. So long as all the required elements are present, it makes no
difference whether the agreement is in writing.

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

/

Modified

Covered - - Other

13G

IDJI 6.06.5- Oral contracts are binding
INSTRUCTION NO. 11
An oral agreement that contains all of the elements of a contract is a

binding contract.

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given - - Refused

Modified - - Covered

Other
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IDJI 6.08.1

Interpretation of contracts - intention of parties (Modified)

Note: The court must first decide whether detem1ination of the intent of the parties is
properly a jury issue. If it is not, obviously the instruction would not be given. Should
the court determine that issue is properly before the jury, the following instruction may
be appropriate:

INSTRUCTION NO. 12
The tenus of the contract are in dispute as to the following
prOVISIOns:
• Whether the defendants agreed to provide ABI with a library
of files worth over one million dollars;
• Whether the defendants agreed to provide ABI with
proprietary software owned by CBI;
• Whether the defendants agreed that payments by ABI would
cease upon the death of Christa Beguesse.
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the
contract in this case. In making this determination you should consider,
from the evidence, the following:

1.

Any communications, conduct or dealings between the

contracting parties showing what they intended and how they construed the
doubtful language may be considered, provided that such may not
completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently with
the remainder of the terms.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given - - Refused - - Modified

Covered

Other
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IDJI 6.08.4- Interpretation of contract- definition of material fact
INSTRUCTIONNO. 13
A "material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the
consideration of the contract, or without which it would not have been made.

Comments:
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub; Fifth Ed., 1979)

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

/
J

Modified

Covered - - Other
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IDJI 6.08.5- Interpretation of contract- materiality

INSTRUCTIONNO. 14
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation m
determining the party's course of action. A representation is material if (a) a
reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence
in determining a choice of action in the transaction in question, or (b) the
maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that the recipient is
likely to regard the matter as important in determining the choice of action,
whether or not a reasonable person would so consider.

Comments:
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998) (tort standard, referring to Restatement
(Second) ofTorts, Sections 538(2).)

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused - - Modified

__;:__

Covered

Other
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IDJI 6.09.1 -Amendments to contracts
INSTRUCTION NO. 15
A contract may be amended or modified by an agreement of the
parties. This requires all of the elements of any other contract.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

J

Refused - - Modified

Covered - - Other " - - -
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IDJI 6.1 0.1 -Breach of bilateral contract- general case- no affirmative defenses
INSTRUCTIONNO. 16
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
propositions:
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant;
2. The defendant breached the contract;
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount of the damages.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of
the propositions required of the plaintiff has been proved, then you must
consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised by the defendant, and
explained in the next instruction. If you find from your consideration of all
the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been
proved, your verdict should be for the defendant.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

Refused - - Modified

j

Covered

Other - -
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IDJI 6.11 -Material breach
INSTRUCTION NO. 17
A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these
instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the
contract.

Comments:
Ervin Const. v. Van Orden, 125 Id. 695,699 (1993)

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

/

Modified

Covered

Other
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IDJI 6.27.1- Fraud (Modified)
INSTRUCTION NO. 18
To establish the defense of fi"aud, ABI has the burden proving by
clear and convincing evidence each of the following propositions:

1. The defendants made a representation of a past or present fact;
2. The representation was false;
3. The represented fact was important;
4. The defendants knew the representation was false (or acted with a
reckless disregard of the truth of the representation);
5. ABI was not aware of the falsity of the representation;
6. The defendants intended that ABI rely upon the representation in
agreeing to enter into the contract;
7. ABI did rely upon the representation;
8. ABI's reliance was justified.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case
that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should
be for ABL

Comment:
Materiality is defined in Instruction 6.08.5

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given - - - Refused

Modified

Covered

Other

144

IDJI 6.27 .3 -Defense of non-disclosure (Modified)
INSTRUCTION NO. 19

A party is not obligated to perform a contract if that party establishes
the defense of nondisclosure. To establish the defense of non-disclosure,
ABI has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear
and convincing evidence.
1.

The defendants were aware of a fact vital to the essence of

the contract;
2.

ABI was unaware of the fact, and could not reasonably learn

3.

The defendants knew that ABI was unaware of the true fact

of it;

and knew that disclosure of the true fact would correct a basic assumption
upon which ABI was making the contract;
4.

The defendants did not disclose the fact to ABI, intending

that ABI would act in ignorance of the fact;
5.

The failure to disclose the true fact amounts to a failure to act

in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing;
[and]
6.

ABI entered into the contract upon the reasonable assumption

that the non-disclosed fact did not exist.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case
that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should
be for ABI.

145

Comment:
There is not definitive Idaho authority on point. This instruction is felt to be
superior to the previous IDJI 651. See, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 161;
obiter dicta in Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho 97 (1964).
The subject of duty to speak was tangentially addressed in Bethlahmy v. Bechtel,
91 Idaho 55, and Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, with references to
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 551. The committee feels the above instruction is
consistent with those cases and the tort restatement, although cast in light of the
Restatement of Contracts provisions.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

/

Modified

Covered

Other

146

IDJI 9.00

Cautionary instruction on damages
INSTRUCTION NO. 20
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not

express any opinion as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

/

Refused

Modified - - Covered

Other
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IDJI 9.03- Damages for breach of contract

general fonnat (Modified)

INSTRUCTION NO. 21

If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
defendant, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonable
and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any of the following elements of
damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the defendant's
conduct:
•

The amounts paid by ABI to the defendants until the date of
Christa Beguesse's death;

•

The difference between the real value of the property
purchased and that value which it would have had the
representations been true.

Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to
determine.

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given - - Refused

Modified

/

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 22
Fraud may be established by silence when a defendant had a duty to speak.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

//

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 23
A duty to speak "arises in situations where the parties do not deal on equal terms
or where information to be conveyed is not already in possession of the other party."
G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991).

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused /

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 24
Fraud may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Idaho State Tax Comm 'n v. Hautzinger, 137 Idaho 401, 404, 49 P.3d 206, 409 (2002).

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction

Given - - Refused

Modified

Covered /

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25
A party is under a duty to disclose if a fact known by one party and not the other
is so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable, and the party
knowing the fact also knows that the other does not know it.

Sowards v. Rathbun, 8 P.3d 1245 (Idaho 2000).

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

/Modified

Covered

Other

IDJI 2.30.2- Proximate cause

"substantial factor," without "but for" test (Modified)
INSTRUCTION NO. 26

When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage
complained of. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a
substantial factor in bringing about the irDury, loss or damage. It is not a
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred
anyway.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

/

Refused

Modified

Covered - - Other
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IDJI 9.13- Present cash value
INSTRUCTION NO. 27
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that
may accrue in the future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid
now which, when invested at a reasonable rate of interest, would be
sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the future
damages will be incurred.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

/

Modified

Covered

Other - - -
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IDJI 9.14- Mitigation of damages
INSTRUCTION NO. 28
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to
minimize the damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results
from a failure to exercise such care cmmot be recovered.

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given - - - Refused

/

Modified

Covered - - Other - - -

INSTRUCTION NO. 29
When considering a claim for constructive fraud, there is no need for the plaintiff
to have proved the defendants' intent, i.e., knowledge of falsity or intent to induce
reliance, since it is inferred directly from the relationship and the breach."
Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. Afyron, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288,294 (2006).

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 30
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate
damages of a different amount
Powers v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 139 Idaho 333, 335 (Idaho 2003)

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given - - Refused

Modified

Covered - - Other

INSTRUCTION NO. 31
When a buyer has goods that do not conform to express or implied warranties, the
buyer keeps the goods and sues for the difference in the value of the goods as received
and the value of the goods as warranted plus, in a proper case, any incidental damages
and consequential damages.
Powers v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 139 Idaho 333, 335 (Idaho 2003)

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 32
ABI asserts that the defendants warTanted that CBI could transfer to ABI certain
assets including a library of proprietary files valued at over one million dollars and a
proprietary software program unique to CBI's business.
A warranty is defined as a promise that something in furtherance of the contract is
guaranteed by one of the contracting parties.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 7th Ed. 1581 (1999)

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given - - Refused

Modified

Covered

Other

INSTRUCTION NO. 33
In every contract for sale there is a warranty of title that the title of the goods is
good and the transfer rightfuL
Idaho Code § 28-2-312.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given - - Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 34
Any affirmation of fact or promise made by a seller to a buyer, which relates to
the goods and becomes a part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods shall confonn to the affirmation or promise.
Idaho Code § 28-2-313.

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given - - Refused

Modified

Covered

Other - -

161

INSTRUCTION NO. 35
Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
Idaho Code Ann. § 28-2-313.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 36
There is a warranty that no other person holds a claim to or interest in the goods
as a matter of law.
Idaho Code Ann. § 28-12-211

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered - - Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 37
Warranties may be express or implied.
An express warranty is a warranty created by words or actions of the seller.
Express warranties may be created by affirmations of fact or promises made by the seller
to the buyer relating to the goods that becomes the basis of the bargain; (2) a description
of the goods that becomes part of the basis of the bargain; or (3) a sample or model made
part of the basis of the bargain.
An implied warranty arises because of the circumstances of the sale rather than a
seller's express promise.
Idaho Code§ 28-2-313; Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 1582 (1999)

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 38
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants expressly
warranted that they were transferring a library of proprietary files valued over one million
dollars and/or a proprietary software program unique to CBI's business to ABI, then your
verdict should be for ABI.

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given - - Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 39
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants did not have
title to a library of proprietary files valued over one million dollars and/or a proprietary
software program unique to CBI's business, then your verdict should be for ABI.

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other - -
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INSTRUCTION NO. 40
ABI asserts that the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets to be
transferred would be merchantable. This implied warranty means that the property is tit
for the ordinary purpose for which it is used and that it would conform to the promises or
affirmations of fact made by the defendants.
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants impliedly
warranted that the library of files and the proprietary software were warranted for a as
merchantable, then your verdict should be for ABI.
Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 1582 (1999)

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 41
ABI asserts that the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets were fit for a
particular purpose. An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose means that if a
seller has reason to know of the buyer's special purpose for the property, that the property
is suitable for those purposes.
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants impliedly
warranted that the library offlles and the propriet(try software were warranted for a
particular purpose, then your verdict should be for ABI.
Idaho Code§ 28-2-315; Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 1582 (1999).

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 42
The term "consequential damages" is defined as losses that do not flow directly
and immediately from an injurious act, but that result indirectly from the act.
Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 394 (1999).

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified - - Covered - - Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 43
The term "incidental damages" is defined as "losses reasonably associated with or
related to actual damages."
Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 395 (1999).

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given - - Refused

Modified

Covered

Other - -
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INSTRUCTION NO. 44
In order to prevail in a misappropriation action under the Idaho Trade Secrets Act,
the defendants must show that a trade secret actually existed. Without a proven trade
secret there can be no misappropriation even if ABI' s action was wrongful.
Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734, 992 P.2d 175, 183 (1999).

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered - - Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 45
Information is only a trade secret if it derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure and
use; and is the subject of effects that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
Idaho Code Ann.

§_48-801(5)(a)~(b).

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given - - - Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 46
One factor that may be considered when deciding if information constitutes a
trade secret is "the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others."
RESTATEMENT (TORTS)§ 757 cmtb (1939); Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho
726, 735, 992 P.2d 175, 184 (1999).

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 47
"Misappropriation" means:
(a) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (b) Disclosure or use of a
trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who:
(A) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge
ofthe trade secret was:
(i) Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire
it;
(ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use; or
(iii) Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking
relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) Before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to know that it was
a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.
Idaho Code§ 48-801

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other

INSTRUCTION NO. 48

In this case, the defendants have asse1ied that ABI misappropriated its trade
secrets by improper means and that such misappropriation has damaged the defendants.
In order to enter a verdict for the defendants, the defendants must demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that ABI misappropriated trade secrets by improper means. If
the defendants do not meet their burden, then your verdict must be for ABL

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered - - Other
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INSTRUCTION NO. 49
The term "improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or
other means.
Idaho Code Ann.§ 48-801(1).

Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
Given

Refused

Modified

Covered

Other
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN ANTI FOR THE COuNTY OF BONNEVILLE
April Beguesse, Inc. An Idaho Corporation, )

Case No. CV-09-2767

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

~-

)

Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa ,
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation.
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its
qualified personal representative, Kenneth
RammeU,

)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL
VERDICT FORM

)

Defendants.

)

COMES NOW, THE Defendants, by and through counsel, and respectfully submit the
following proposed Jury Instructions No. 1 through 40 and Special Verdict Form. This Defendant
reserves the right to submit additional instructions at trial based upon issues that may arise during the
course of the trial or after review of Plaintiffs proposed jury instructions.
DATED

this~ day of January, 2011.

DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1

177

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

the~1hay

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
ofJanuary, 2011, I served a true, correct and copy
ofthe above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows

Jeffrey D. Brunson
John M. Avondet
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

[] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
N Facsimile (?,08) 529-9732 .
{?Hi /:!#tcul

io

.
1
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DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2
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.

INSTRUCTION NO. _(_

The following facts are not in dispute:
Plaintiff April Beguesse, Inc., (ABI) is an Idaho corporation fully owned by April
Beguesse. Defendant Clnista Beguesse, Inc., (CBI) is an Idaho corporation whose shares are
owned by Defendants Ke1meth J. Rann11ell and the Estate of Christa Beguesse-Rammell.
Christa Rammell and Kenneth Rammell were married in Califomia in 1988, and they
remained manied until her death in November 2008. Cluista was the mother from a previous
marriage of April Beguesse. Kenneth Rammell was Clnista's sole heir under a Last \Vill and
Testament she wrote in September 2007.
Until January 2004, CBI operated a typesetting business located in Idaho Falls. Clu·ista
Beguesse started a typesetting business in Califomia in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, she began
typesetting law books for a California publisher called The Rutter Group. By the mid-1990s, The
Rutter Group represented most ofClnista's business. In 1995, Cluista Rammell fom1ed CBI as a
California corporation. In 1996, she dissolved the Califomia corporation, moved to Idaho Falls
with Ke1meth Rammell, and fon11ed the Idaho corporation, Clnista Beguesse, Inc., which is a
party to this case.
After the move to Idaho, CBI retained only one customer, The Rutter Group. CBI had no
contract or binding agreement requiring The Rutter Group to use CBI's typesetting services. CBI
continued to operate the typesetting business until it sold the business to April Beguesse, Inc. in
January 2004.
In November 2001, Ken and Christa Rammell proposed to April Beguesse that she move
to Idaho Falls and go to work for CBI in order to leam the business so she could take it over.
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April did so and began working for CBI in January 2002. Cbxista taught April the operation of
the business and made sure that the customer approved of the planned change in ownership.
April Beguesse was aware that The Rutter Group was not obligated by contract to use her
services, and could take its typesetting business to another provider at any time. By this time, The
Rutter Group was owned by West Publishing, a division of Thomson Reuters Corporation, one of
the largest publishing companies in the world.
In January 2004, the business began operating in the same location and with the same
equipment, assets and employees under the ownership of ABI. Under the agreement entered into
between ABI and CBI, ABI was to pay to CBI the sum of$12,000.00 per month for eight years,
and Christa Beguesse was to be available to ABI for consulting as needed.
ABI made those payments for four years and 10 months until Clnista's death in November
2008. From January 2004 through December 2008, ABI had revenues from its one customer, The
Rutter Group, of $1 ,929,068.00. During that same time, out of those revenues, ABI made
payments to CBI pursuant to the agreement in the amount of$684,520.00. Also during that time,
ABI paid salary, benefits and profits to April Beguesse in the amount of at least $489,262.00.
ABI is still operating the typesetting business and doing work for The Rutter Group. It has
lost none of the work it was doing for The Rutter Group before Cluista's death, and has obtained
new business since Clnista's death. ABI has incuned no monetary damages as a result of the
fraud, breach of contract and breach of wananty alleged in this case.

IDJI 1.07- Facts not in dispute
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GIVEN:- - REFUSED :_/_,_
MODIFIED: _ __
COVERED: _ __
OTHER: _ _ __
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INSTRUCTION NO.

V

The corporations involved in this case are entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced
treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances. You should decide this case with
the same impmiiality that you would use in deciding a case between individuals.

IDJI 1.02- Corporate pmiies

I

GIVEN:
/
REFUSED:- - - MODIFIED: - - - COVERED: - - - OTHER:- - - - -
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INSTRUCTION NO.

L

Ce1iain contracts must be in writing to be enforceable. If such a contract exists but is not in
writing, this does not mean that there is no contract, or that it is illegal or improper, it simply means
that the contract may not be enforced in court.

IDJI 6.06.4- Ce1iain agreements must be in writing

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION NO.4-

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if you
find'' or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably tme
than not tme.

IDJI 1.20.1

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:

/
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INSTRUCTION NO.

5

On plaintiff's claim of constructive fraud against the defendants, the plamtiff has the
burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence:
1.

That there existed between the plaintiff and the defendants such a relationship of

trust and confidence that it created in the defendants an obligation not to exert influence or
pressure on the plaintiff, or take selfish advantage of the plaintiff's trust, or deal with the subject
matter of the trust in such a way as to benefit themselves or prejudice the plaintiff except in the
utmost good faith and with the full knowledge and consent ofthe plaintiff;
2.

That the defendants stated a fact to the plaintiff, or failed to disclose to the plaintiff

a fact known to them;
3.

The statement was false, or the failure to disclose the fact left the plaintiff with

incomplete or incorrect knowledge;
4.

The statement or fact was material;

5.

The plaintiff did not know that the fact was false, or that his knowledge was

incomplete or incorrect;
6.

The plaintiff relied upon the truth of the statement, or upon its incomplete or

incorrect knowledge;
7.

The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

8.

The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false

statement.
9.

The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did the defendants commit constructive fraud?
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If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of constructive
fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the
plaintiff on this issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the
foregoing propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict
should be for the defendant

IDJI 1.41.2

Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories
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INSTRUCTION NO.

t

lQ

On plaintiff's claim of fraud against the defendants, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence:
1.

That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff;

2.

The statement was false;

3

The statement was material;

4.

The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the

statement was true at the time the statement was made.
5.

The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false;

6.

The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it

in a manner reasonably contemplated;
7.

The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false

statement.
10.

The nature and extent ofthe damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did the defendants commit fraud?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing
propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be
for the defendant.
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IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories
Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A charging instruction
such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of action covered by a special
interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence may be modified as necessary to
specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which is covered by the charging instruction and
the special verdict interrogatory to which it relates.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _____,__
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing evidence,
I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher
burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than not true.

IDJI 1.20.2- Burden of proof- clear and convincing evidence

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:

J

-----
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INSTRUCTION NO

<6

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantiaL The law makes no distinction between direct
and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected
for such convincing force as it may carry.

IDJI 1.24.1 -Circumstantial evidence without definition

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION NO.~
On the issue of fraud, the Plaintiff, April Beguesse Inc., has the burden of proof on each of
the following propositions by clear and convmcing evidence:
1.

That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the

statement was true at the time the statement was made.
5.

The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false;

6.

The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it in

a manner reasonably contemplated;

7.

The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement.

10.

The nature and extent ofthe damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have been
proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this issue.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has not
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the defendant.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the foregoing
propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the Plaintiff If you find that any of the
propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the Defendants.
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IDJI 1.40.1- General format, general verdict, and and IDJI 4.60

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:

Fraud- Issues.

/
----
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INSTRUCTION NO

_ _,__,__,__

On the defendants' counterclaim claim of breach of contract against Plaintiff, the defendants
have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant;
2. The plaintiff ABI breached the contract;
3. The defendants have been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount ofthe damages.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did ABI breach a contract with any of the defendants?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of
all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this
question "no."

IDJI 1.41.3

Charging instructions on defense claims- special interrogatories

Comment:
The committee recommends that when there are affirmative defenses or counterclaims, and in any
case involving multiple claims, cross claims or third party claims, verdicts on special
interrogatories be used. Then, each party's claim, counterclaim or cross claim can be isolated into
a charging instruction which defines that claim, and sets forth the elements necessary to answer
the special interrogatory.

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
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INSTRUCTION NO.

\l

On the defendants' claim of implied contract or unjust enrichment against Plaintiff
The doctrine of m~ust enrichment states that in the absence of circumstances indicating
otherwise, it is inferred that a person who requests another to transfer prope11y to him thereby
bargains to pay for it.
The measure of recovery for services furnished or goods received under the doctrine of unjust
enrichment is the value of the actual benefit realized and retained by the plaintiff
The defendant has the burden of proving the elements of unjust enrichment as follows
I. That the plaintiff requested the defendant to transfer property to her;
2. That given all the circumstances existing at that time, it appears that the plaintiff agreed
to pay for that property; and
3. The value of the actual benefit realized and retained by the plaintiff.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Should the defendants recover from the plaintiff on their claim of unjust enrichment or
implied contract?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of
all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this
question "no."

IDIT 1.41.3 -Charging instructions on defense claims- special interrogatories

Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 434 (App. 2002)
Comment:

The committee recommends that when there are affirmative defenses or counterclaims, and in any
case involving multiple claims, cross claims or third party claims, verdicts on special
interrogatories be used. Then, each party's claim, counterclaim or cross claim can be Isolated into
a charging instruction which defines that claim, and sets forth the elements necessary to answer
the special interrogatory.

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:

--

/

--

--
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INSTRUCTIONNO.

\V

On defendants' counterclaim for misappropriation of trade secrets against the plaintiff, the
defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

That the defendants possessed trade secrets;

2.

That the plaintiff used theft, bribery, or misrepresentation to acquire knowledge of

the defendants' trade secrets;
3.

That the plaintiff disclosed or used the defendants' trade secrets without the

express or implied consent ofthe defendants; and
4.

The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did the plaintiff ABI misappropriate trade secrets belonging to one or more of the
defendants?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of
aU of the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this
question "no."

IDJI 1. 41.2

Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories, revised

Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A charging instruction
such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of action covered by a special
interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence may be modified as necessary to
specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which is covered by the charging instruction and
the special verdict interrogatory to which it relates.
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Given:
Refused:
Modified
Covered.
Other:

INSTRUCTION NO. \ )
On the plaintiff's claim of breach of contract against the defendants, the plaintiff has the
burden of proof on each of the following propositions
A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant;
2. The defendants breached the contract;
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount ofthe damages
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did the defendants breach a contract with plaintiff ABI?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of
all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this
question "no."

IDJI 1.41.3

Charging instructions on defense claims - special interrogatories

Comment:
The committee recommends that when there are affirmative defenses or counterclaims, and in any
case involving multiple claims, cross claims or third party claims, verdicts on special
interrogatories be used. Then, each party's claim, counterclaim or cross claim can be Isolated into
a charging instruction which defines that claim, and sets forth the elements necessary to answer
the special interrogatory.

Given:
Refused:
Modified
Covered:
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INSTRUCTION NO

4

On the plaintiffs claim ofbreach of express warranty with regard to the so-called proprietary
software, the plaintiffhas the burden of proof on each ofthe followmg propositions:
1. The defendants expressly warranted the existence of propnetary software unique to CBI
and authored by Christa Beguesse from scratch;
2. The defendants breached the warranty;
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount ofthe damages.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did the defendants breach an express warranty with ABI relating to the proprietary
software?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of
all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this
question "no."

IDJI 1.41.3

Charging instructions on defense claims- special interrogatories

Comment:
The committee recommends that when there are affirmative defenses or counterclaims, and in any
case involving multiple claims, cross claims or third party claims, verdicts on special
interrogatories be used. Then, each party's claim, counterclaim or cross claim can be isolated into
a charging instruction which defines that claim, and sets forth the elements necessary to answer
the special interrogatory.

Given
Refused.
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION NO.
The terms of the contract are in dispute as to the following provisions·
Whether the parties agreed that the assets of the business to be transferred from Christa
Beguesse, Inc. to April Beguesse, Inc., included ( 1) the copyrights in the library of publications which
the business typeset for its customer, and (2) a proprietary computer program, written by Christa
Beguesse, that allowed the Adobe PageMaker program to read files created by Microsoft \Vord.
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the contract in this
case. In making this determination you should consider, from the evidence, the following:
I.

The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances

giving rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it
2.

Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the evidence

that a special meaning was intended.
3.

Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties showing

what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may be considered, provided
that such may not completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently with the
remainder of the terms.
4.

The contract should be construed to avoid any contradiction or absurdities.

Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted with reference to any
generally known and customarily accepted language in that field, unless you find from the
evidence that this was not intended.

IDJI 6.08.1

Interpretation of contracts- intention ofparties

Given:
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other:

INSTRUCTION NO.

H0

You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by any witness,
or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the written agreement, which is
inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement While you may consider the
testimony ofwitnesses if necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to
completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a fashion that it no
longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts.

IDJI 6. 08.2- Interpretation of contract - witness's testimony, ambiguity of contract

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION NO.

\l

A "material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the consideration of the contract, or
without which it would not have been made.

IDJI 6.08.4- Interpretation of contract - definition of material fact
Comments:
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub; Fifth Ed, 1979)

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:

j
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Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION NO.

\c{

"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in determining the party's course
of action. A representation is material if (a) a reasonable person would attach importance to its
existence or nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the transaction in question, or (b) the
maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that the recipient is likely to regard the
matter as important in determining the choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person would
so consider.

IDJI 6.08.5- Interpretation of contract- materiality

Comments:
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998) (tort standard, referring to Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Sections 538(2).)

20G

INSTRUCTION NO.li
\

A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do something that is
supported by consideration.
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four
elements. The four elements are:
Competent parties;
2.

A lawful purpose;

3.

Valid consideration; and

4.

Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms.

It is not disputed that the following elements are present in the contract alleged in this case:
The parties are competent to enter into a contract, and the alleged contract was for a lawful purpose.

IDJI 6.01. 1- Elements of contract- introductory

Comment:
The committee recommends that this instruction be used only where the jury actually needs
a "lecture on contracts" The detailed instruction should usually be unnecessary, as only specific issues
in dispute need be covered.

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, April Beguesse, Inc. alleges that there was no consideration to support the
existence of a contract.
A promise is not enforceable as a contract unless something of value was given or was agreed
to be given in exchange for it. In law, the giving of value or agreement to give value is called
"consideration'' Consideration is the benefit given or agreed to be given by one party in exchange
for the other party's performance or promise to perform.
Consideration must have value; if it has no value at all, it is not sufficient. If the parties have
agreed upon the specific consideration to be given in this case, then any value, however slight, is
sufficient.

IDJI 6.04.1 -Consideration

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION NO
In this case, April Beguesse, Inc. alleges that all parties did not agree to all essential terms of
the contract. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "meeting of the minds," and means that
all parties to a contract must have understood and accepted all of the essential terms of the contract
There is no contract unless all of the essential terms have been communicated to all parties,
understood by all parties, and accepted by all parties.

IDJI 6.05.1 -Agreement on all material terms

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other
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INSTRUCTION NO

1,.2.--

A contract may be written or oral, or may contain both written terms and oral terms. So long
as all the required elements are present, it makes no difference whether the agreement is in writing.

IDJI 6.06.1 -Contract may be written or oral

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:

j
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Certain contracts must be in writing to be enforceable If such a contract exists but is not in
writing, this does not mean that there is no contract, or that it is illegal or improper, it simply means
that the contract may not be enforced in court.

IDJI 6.06.4- Certain agreements must be in writing

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION NO.

L~-

An agency relationship exists where one, called the "principal," has authorized another, called

the "agent," to act on behalf of the principal.
Agency requires the consent of the principal, which consent may be expressed or implied. [A
business purpose is not required.] [Compensation ofthe agent is not required.] [The term "principal"
includes employers, and the term "agent" includes employees.]

IDJI 6.40.5- Agency defined

Comments:
Note: Use bracketed portions applicable to case. See, Thornton v. Budge, 257 P 2d 238, 240,
74 Idaho 103 (Idaho 1953).

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION NO.

--=----''---

In this case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defenses to the claim offraud The
defendant has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted.
The Defendant has asserted that the clmm of fraud is barred by the statute oflimitations. The
statute oflimitations for fraud begins to run when the plaintiffknew or reasonably should have known
of the facts constituting the fraud. You can infer that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud at the time that the plaintiff could have discovered the fraud by the exercise of
due diligence.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the plaintiff knew or reasonably
should have known of the facts constituting the fraud on or before May 7, 2006, then your verdict
should be for the defense. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these
propositions have not been proved, then the defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in this
case.

IDJI 6.1 0.4 - General contract- affirmative defenses

McCorkle v. Northlt-'estem Mutual Life Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 550, 554-555 (App. 2005)
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Given:
Refused
Modified:
Covered
Other:

INSTRUCTION NO.

1.J[)

A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these instructions, means a breach that
defeats a fundamental purpose of the contract.

IDJI 6.11 -Material breach

Comments:
Ervin Const v. Van Orden, 125 Id. 695, 699 (1993)

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:

215

INSTRUCTION NO.

2']

When I say that a party must have "substantially performed" the contract or that "substantial
performance" of the contract is required, I mean that the important and essential benefits called for
by the terms of the contract have been delivered or performed. A contract may be substantially
performed even though there may have been some deviations or omissions from the performance
called for by the precise language of the contract.

IDJI 6.13 -Performance of contract- substantial performance

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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DEFEND~l\JTS

RESERVE THE RJGHT TO SlJBMIT AN APPROPRJATE INSTRUCTION ON
IMPOSSIBILITY IF THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIES IT
INSTRUCTION NO
In this case, the defendant has claimed the defense of impossibility because ofthe following
circumstance:
[Insei1 description of circumstance, such as death of essential participant, destruction of
essential property, unforeseen change of law, act of God, etc. ]
In order for this defense to apply, the defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following:
1.

The circumstance alleged by the defendant exists or existed through no fault of the

defendant.
2.

The happening of this circumstance could not reasonably have been anticipated by the

defendant when the contract was entered into.
3.

The happening of this circumstance was not assigned or assumed as the responsibility

of any party by the contract itself
4.

The happening ofthis circumstance prevents the performance ofthe contract in its

essential and important terms.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the foregoing
propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that any of the
propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff

IDJI 6.26

Impossibility as a defense
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Given:
Refused
Modified·
Covered:
Other:
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t'

INSTRUCTION NO. ·1-i

The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions:
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant;
2. The defendant breached the contract;
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount of the damages.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions
required of the plaintiff has been proved, then you must consider the issue of the affirmative
defenses raised by the defendant, and explained in the next instruction. If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been
proved, your verdict should be for the defendant.

IDJI 6. l 0. l -Breach of bilateral contract- general case- no affirmative defenses

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION NO
In this case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defenses to the claim of breach of
contract. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted.
The Defendant has asserted that the claim of breach of contract arising from the ownership
ofthe PageMaker-format files is barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for
breach of contract begins to run when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that a third
party was making an adverse claim to ownership of the property.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the plaintiff knew or reasonably
should have known that a third party was making an adverse claim to ownership of the PageMakerformat files on or before May 7, 2005, then your verdict should be for the defense. If you find from
your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions have not been proved, then the
defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in this case.

IDJI 6.1 0.4- General contract- affirmative defenses

Cuevas v. Barrazza, 146 Idaho 511, 517 (App. 2008)

Given:
Refused.
Modified
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION NO.

--1--

In this case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defenses to the claims of breach of
contract and breach of warranty. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative
defenses asserted.
In this case, the Court has found that the claims ofbreach of contract and breach of warranty
arising from the proprietary software claim is barred by the statute oflimitations unless the plaintiff
proves that an exception to the statute of limitations applies. To prove the exception, the plaintiff
must prove each of the following elements :
( 1) That defendants made a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual
or constructive knowledge of the truth;

(2) that the plaintiff did not know or could not discover the truth;
(3) that the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied on;
and

(4) that the plaintiff relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice,
with the result that the plaintiff was unable to determine that the software was not proprietary before
May 7, 2005.
If you found in favor of the plaintiff on its claims of either breach of contract or breach of
warranty arising from the proprietary software issue, you must consider whether the plaintiff has
proven the four elements above. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the
plaintiff has proven each of these four elements, then your verdict on the claim for breach of contract
arising from the proprietary software issue should be for the plaintiff

If you find from your

consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions have not been proved, then your
verdict should be for the defendant
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ID JI 6.1 0. 4 - General contract - affirmative defenses (revised)

City ofMcCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 663-64 (2009)

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:

222

INSTRUCTION NO.

:z,_.

In this case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defenses to the claims of fraud,
breach of contract and breach of warranty. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the
affirmative defenses asserted.
The Defendant has asserted that the claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. "Laches"
means the neglect to assert a right or a claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the other party, such that it would be unfair to permit the plaintiff
to bring the claim at this time. statute oflimitations. The statute oflimitations for fraud begins to run
when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the facts constituting the fraud. You can
infer that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud at the time that the
plaintiff could have discovered the fraud by the exercise of due diligence.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the plaintiff knew or reasonably
should have known of the facts constituting the fraud on or before May 7, 2006, then your verdict
should be for the defense. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these
propositions have not been proved, then the defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in this
case.

IDJI 6.1 0.4 - General contract- affirmative defenses
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (5th ed. 1979)

Eldridge v. Idaho State Penitenthay, 54Idaho 213, 222 (1934)

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:

INSTRUCTION NO.
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

IDJI 9.00- Cautionary instruction on damages

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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INSTRUCTION

NO.~~

If the JUry decides the defendants are entitled to recover from the plaintiff on their
counterclaim for breach of contract, the jury must determine the amount of money that will
reasonable and fairly compensate the defendant for any of the following elements of damages proved
by the evidence to have resulted from the plaintiffs breach of contract·
The total amount of payments due from plaintiff to defendants under the agreement between
the parties which have not been paid as oftoday's date, and the total amount of payments, if any, due
to the defendants in the future;
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to determine.

IDJI 9.03

Damages for breach of contract- general format

revised

Given:

22G

Refused
Modified
Covered

Other
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INSTRUCTION NO.
If the jury decides the defendants are entitled to recover from the plaintiff on their
counterclaim for unjust enrichment, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably
and fairly compensate the defendant for damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the
unjust enrichment.
The measure of damages is the total value of the actual benefit realized and retained by the
plaintiff resulting from the transfer of business property to the plaintiff
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to determine.

IDJI 9.03- Damages for breach of contract

Given:
Refused:
Modified:

general format- revised

Covered:
Other
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'?l

INSTRUCTION NO ...:::> lP
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the jury must
determine the amount of money that will reasonable and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any of the
following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the defendant's breach
of contract:
UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to determine.

IDJI 9.03

Damages for breach of contract

general format

Given:
Refused:
Modified:
Covered:
Other:
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